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INTRODUCTION 
Civil unrest erupted in American cities throughout the 1960s in 
response to police brutality, racial profiling, discrimination, and 
unemployment.  Riots engulfed Los Angeles in 1965;1 Detroit and 
more than a dozen other cities followed in the summer of 1967.2  
                                                                                                                 
 1. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:  
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 58 (1993). 
 2. See generally NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968). 
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While the type of overt racism and discrimination that existed in the 
years leading up to the 1960s is largely a thing of the past, the 
continuing realities of police brutality gave rise to similarly profound 
unrest in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland, in 2014 and 
2015, respectively, as demonstrators protested failed governance and 
a lack of opportunity.3  Indeed, these troubling and persistent issues 
surfaced in the landmark 2015 Supreme Court decision, Texas 
Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project,4 concerning the location of affordable housing 
in areas of concentrated poverty.  In the words of Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority: 
De jure residential segregation by race was declared 
unconstitutional almost a century ago . . . but its vestiges remain 
today, intertwined with the country’s economic and social life . . . . 
Rapid urbanization, concomitant with the rise of suburban 
developments accessible by car, led many white families to leave the 
inner cities.  This often left minority families concentrated in the 
center of the Nation’s cities.  During this time, various practices 
were followed, sometimes with governmental support, to encourage 
and maintain the separation of the races:  Racially restrictive 
covenants prevented the conveyance of property to 
minorities . . . steering by real-estate agents . . . and discriminatory 
lending practices, often referred to as redlining, precluded minority 
families from purchasing homes in affluent areas . . . . By the 1960’s, 
these policies, practices, and prejudices had created many 
predominantly black inner cities surrounded by mostly white 
suburbs . . . . [T]he National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders . . . concluded that “[o]ur Nation is moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”5 
Continuing disparities manifest themselves in astonishingly high 
income and wealth inequality between whites and people of color, 
especially African Americans and Latinos.6  Although race and class 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See generally Richard Rothstein, From Ferguson to Baltimore:  The Fruits of 
Government-Sponsored Segregation, ECON. POL’Y INST.:  WORKING ECON. BLOG 
(Apr. 29, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/from-ferguson-to-baltimore-the-
fruits-of-government-sponsored-segregation [https://perma.cc/8J6Q-3GQK]. 
 4. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
 5. Id. at 2515-16. 
 6. See Edward N. Wolff, The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the 
Middle Class 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 18559, Nov. 2012), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18559.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4N9-3Z8S].  For example, 
from 1982 to 2009, the median income ratios between African Americans and Whites 
and Latinos and Whites remained roughly unchanged from fifty-six to fifty-nine 
percent, and from sixty-six to sixty-seven percent, respectively.  The household 
median wealth ratio between African Americans and Whites declined from seven to 
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residential segregation diminished somewhat in the late 1980s, 
differential access to opportunities remains a significant problem 
today.7  Transportation is both a key driver of these continued 
problems and a sector on which billions of dollars of federal, state, 
regional, and local funds are spent every year.  Although 
transportation infrastructure is but a single component of a mix of 
factors at play, there is overwhelming evidence linking transportation 
with employment outcomes and other opportunities, especially in 
communities of color.8 
Transportation is inextricably bound up with land use.  By making 
land available for development or by changing the speed with which 
one can travel between locations, transportation infrastructure affects 
the relative attractiveness of different locations.  As transportation 
technology has advanced from the horse-drawn carriage, to the 
electric streetcar, to the automobile, the spatial extent of urban 
development has expanded ever outward.9  The result is the 
metropolitan region—agglomerations of cities and counties bound 
together by commuting patterns and shared housing and labor 
markets.  Congress recognized the importance of planning at the 
regional scale when it created metropolitan planning organizations 
(“MPOs”).10  Despite a regional planning emphasis, individual 
                                                                                                                 
five percent, and for and Hispanics and Whites it declined from four to one percent. 
See generally ROLF PENDALL & CARL HEDMAN, URB. LAND INST., WORLDS APART:  
INEQUALITY BETWEEN AMERICA’S MOST AND LEAST AFFLUENT NEIGHBORHOODS 1-
9 (Jun. 2015). 
 7. See Richard Rothstein, Racial Segregation Continues, and Even Intensifies, 
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/racial-segregation-
continues-intensifies [https://perma.cc/6KJF-BNXB]; Comment to Edward Glaeser & 
Jacob Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century:  Racial Separation in America’s 
Neighborhoods, 1890-2010, 2012 CTR. FOR ST. & LOC. LEADERSHIP AT THE 
MANHATTAN INST. 66. 
 8. The McCone Commission, which investigated the causes of the Watts riots in 
Los Angeles in 1965, pointed specifically to the segregation of Watts from 
increasingly suburban employment opportunities and the insufficiency of public 
transit links between them. See GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON THE L.A. RIOTS, OFF. OF 
THE GOVERNOR, CAL., VIOLENCE IN THE CITY–AN END OR A BEGINNING? (1965); see 
also John F. Kain & John R. Meyer, Transportation and Poverty, 1970 PUB. INT. 18, 
75-76; John F. Kain, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan 
Decentralization, 82 Q. J. ECON. 180-81, (1968). 
 9. See, e.g., Peter O. Muller, Transportation and Urban Form:  Stages in the 
Spatial Evolution of the American Metropolis, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN 
TRANSPORTATION 59, 60 (Susan Hanson & Genevieve Giuliano eds., 3d ed. 2004). 
 10. 23 U.S.C. § 134(a)(1)-(2) (2017) (“It is in the national interest (1) to 
encourage and promote the safe and efficient management, operation, and 
development of surface transportation systems . . . and; (2) to encourage the 
continued improvement and evolution of the metropolitan and statewide 
transportation planning processes by metropolitan planning organizations . . . .”). 
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localities within a region still wield substantial power and can 
undermine regional planners’ goals by, for example, refusing to 
permit affordable housing or support investments in regional public 
transit systems.11  After decades of investments that facilitated 
suburban growth, some locations enjoy access to high quality schools, 
health care facilities, and transportation, while others are locked in a 
cycle of decline.12  By shaping regional investments, MPOs affect 
three important “drivers” of regional inequality:  unrepresentative 
governance, unequal access to opportunities, and unfair distribution 
of the benefits and burdens of regional growth.  Consequently, MPOs 
hold great potential to address equity issues. 
This Article will address the transportation planning institutions 
bound by law to advance the twin goals of civil rights and 
environmental justice.  We contend that stronger guidance requiring 
robust equity analyses for regional plans13 has the potential to result 
in better planning and outcomes for metropolitan regions.  First, the 
Article begins with a discussion of the historical development of 
metropolitan regions in the United States and the devastating 
burdens that regional growth imposes on certain communities.  
Second, the Article surveys MPOs and the standards for regional 
planning set for them by federal law.14  Third, the Article examines 
key pieces of federal law and executive guidance directly impacting 
MPO planning, including Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Executive Order 12898 on Environmental Justice (“EJ Executive 
Order”), and the duty under the Fair Housing Act to “affirmatively 
further fair housing.”15  The Article then scrutinizes the “equity 
analysis” required of MPOs.  Lastly, the Article reflects on the 
potential benefits and shortfalls of the existing practice, and offers 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See, e.g., CHRISTINA D. ROSAN, GOVERNING THE FRAGMENTED METROPOLIS:  
PLANNING FOR REGIONAL SUSTAINABILITY 153-68 (2016). 
 12. See, e.g., Anthony R. Foxx, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Remarks at the 
Center for American Progress, Bridging the Divide:  Connecting People to 
Opportunity (Mar. 30, 2016). 
 13. This Article addresses the Long-Range Transportation Plan (“LRTP”), 
sometimes shortened to “regional transportation plan” (“RTP”), as the core tool of 
regional planning. 
 14. Nationally, around forty billion dollars is to be spent annually (2016 to 2020) 
under the 2016 authorization of the Fast-Act; a significant share of that passes 
through projects and plans overseen by MPOs. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF TRANSP., Notice of Apportionment of Federal-Aid Highway Program 
Funds for Fiscal Year 2016 (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/legsregs/
directives/notices/n4510802 [https://perma.cc/AUU9-QH7V]. 
 15. See Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 
2016) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, and 903). 
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proposals to strengthen the equity analysis requirement that derive 
from experience working with these planning processes. 
I.  THE METROPOLITAN REGION AND REGIONAL INEQUITY 
Twentieth century metropolitan growth in the United States 
resulted in regions nominally linked by transportation infrastructure 
and shared housing and labor markets, but separated by vast 
differences in racial composition, wealth, crime, health outcomes, and 
access to opportunities like quality education and employment.16  
These disparities often map consistently onto patterns of racial 
segregation.17  Research on “regional equity” focuses on 
understanding maldistributions of opportunity within regions and has 
identified land use, housing, and transportation as policy elements 
affecting equitable outcomes.18 
This Part traces the development of the country’s metropolitan 
areas and the racial inequalities that accompanied it, emphasizing the 
connected nature of land use, housing, and transportation.  It focuses 
on the last century of metropolitan expansion, suburbanization, and 
the solidification of unequal regions across the country, and highlights 
the challenge of affecting regional outcomes due to the virtual non-
existence of directly elected regional governments.19  The Part closes 
by highlighting the innate potential for MPOs—regional planning 
agencies empowered by federal and state law to make decisions about 
the allocation of billions of dollars in transportation resources—to 
bring about equitable outcomes. 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See generally Robert D. Bullard, Introduction, in GROWING SMARTER:  
ACHIEVING LIVABLE COMMUNITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, AND REGIONAL 
EQUITY 4-16 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 2007); PETER DREIER ET AL., PLACE MATTERS:  
METROPOLITICS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3-4 (3d ed. 2014); MYRON 
ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS:  THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY 23-49 (2011). 
 17. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 1, at 148-85; David R. Williams & 
Chiquita Collins, Racial Residential Segregation:  A Fundamental Cause of Racial 
Disparities in Health, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 406-09, (2001); see also Bullard, supra 
note 16; Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & David L. Sjoquist, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis:  
A Review of Recent Studies and Their Implications for Welfare Reform, 9 HOUS. 
POL’Y DEBATE 849, 851, 877-82 (1998). 
 18. See, e.g., CHRIS BENNER & MANUEL PASTOR, JUST GROWTH:  INCLUSION AND 
PROSPERITY IN AMERICA’S METROPOLITAN REGIONS 1-9, 23 (2012). 
 19. See id. at 1-9. For a more detailed discussion of the importance of regional 
governments, see MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., THIS COULD BE THE START OF 
SOMETHING BIG:  HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FOR REGIONAL EQUITY ARE RESHAPING 
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 97-98, 147, 187 (2009). 
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A. Early Suburbanization 
Rates of urbanization began to explode in the late nineteenth 
century, driven by the Great Migration, the mechanization of 
agriculture, and the rapid immigration of low-skilled workers from 
Europe.20  While growing cities across the United States were rife 
with opportunities, they also suffered from significant burdens 
created by rapid industrialization and dense urbanization, including 
noise, pollution, and overcrowding.21 
As transportation technology like streetcars, regional rail, and the 
automobile improved, those who could afford to sought housing 
outside the urban core.22  Distances that would have taken hours to 
travel in the past now took minutes.  The size of regions—contiguous 
geographies defined by strong economic interdependencies—
expanded in kind.  For example, the Los Angeles metropolitan area 
grew from forty-two square miles in 1900 to over four hundred by 
1930.23 
While the engines of metropolitan economies largely remained 
their central cities, suburbanization complicated governance by 
dispersing populations and power across the landscape.  Early in this 
process, many suburbanizing areas were annexed into the central city, 
but this practice was stopped in many places beginning in the 1920s.24  
Suburban districts were increasingly empowered by statehouses to 
defend themselves through municipal incorporation, allowing them to 
avoid central city burdens.25  As wealth increased in the suburbs, so 
did tax bases and school quality, providing the foundations of regional 
fragmentation and exclusion.26  The process of local zoning—
                                                                                                                 
 20. See generally Patrick J. Ashton, The Political Economy of Suburban 
Development, in MARXISM AND THE METROPOLIS 64, 64-70 (William K. Tabb & 
Larry Sawers eds., 1978); MARK S. FOSTER, FROM STREETCAR TO SUPERHIGHWAY 1-
24 (1981); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER:  THE SUBURBANIZATION OF 
THE UNITED STATES 288-89 (1985). 
 21. See FOSTER, supra note 20. 
 22. See JACKSON, supra note 20, at 174-77; Muller, supra note 9, at 61-63 
(describing four “eras” of the relationship between transportation technology and the 
spatial extent and urban form of cities). 
 23. See EDWARD W. SOJA, SEEKING SPATIAL JUSTICE 224 (2010). 
 24. Scott Greer, The Governmental Dilemma of the Metropolis, in THE 
URBANIZATION OF AMERICA:  AN HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY 384, 386 (Allen M. 
Wakstein ed., 1970). 
 25. DREIER ET AL., supra note 16, at 37 (discussing the adoption of state-level laws 
permitting suburban incorporation). 
 26. See generally GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING:  BUILDING COMMUNITIES 
WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 143-45 (1999) (noting that a desire to exclude 
undesirable residents and exert control over local land uses drives the decisions of 
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regulating specific land uses and allowable construction—was integral 
to this process.  In 1916, New York City famously adopted the first 
comprehensive zoning code.27  Less well known is the first explicitly 
racial zoning ordinance, adopted by Baltimore in 1910.28  The U.S. 
Department of Commerce began promoting model zoning codes in 
the 1920s.29  City ordinances excluding particular land uses as well as 
certain communities of people were ubiquitous by the end of that 
decade.30  Although most codes did not include explicitly racist 
provisions, which were struck down by the Supreme Court in 1917 in 
Buchanan v. Warley,31 planners were able to use more general zoning 
restrictions to effect racially exclusionary outcomes.32 
In particular, innovations in zoning practices allowed localities to 
shape the housing supply and limit the construction of housing better 
suited to lower income residents by, for example, prohibiting 
construction of new multifamily units or requiring minimum lot 
sizes.33  In 1926, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
zoning in general in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., a case 
involving restrictions on residential density in a new Ohio suburb.34  
The landmark decision opened the door for localities to exclude by 
using proxies for race and class.  For example, “nuisances” could be 
defined as apartment buildings and boarding houses, 
disproportionately occupied by low-income people and people of 
color.35 
B. White Flight, Subsidized Post-War Suburbanization, and Effects 
on Central Cities 
Although the pace of suburbanization slowed during the Great 
Depression,36 a series of federal actions in the 1930s codified racial 
exclusion in time for the post-war suburbanization boom.  Most 
                                                                                                                 
individual jurisdictions); ORFIELD, supra note 16, at 9 (describing school quality and 
tax bases as the two most important characteristics of a jurisdiction). 
 27. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 241-42. 
 28. See DAVID M. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY:  STATE POLICY AND WHITE 
RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA 59 (2010). 
 29. Id. at 72. 
 30. Id. at 80. 
 31. 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917). 
 32. FREUND, supra note 28, at 59. 
 33. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands:  Exclusionary Zoning, 
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 781-97 (1969). 
 34. 272 U.S. 365, 379-85 (1926). 
 35. FREUND, supra note 28, at 83. 
 36. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction:  A History and Critique 
of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 237 (2010). 
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significantly, the protection of private lenders against default via the 
creation of the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) 
dramatically lowered interest rates and increased lending.37  
Importantly, the FHA required the mortgage, home, and buyer to 
meet minimum requirements and favored lending for new homes 
located in suburban areas.38  The agency’s notorious “redlining” 
manuals required lenders to document and rate neighborhoods based 
on their racial characteristics.39  All-white neighborhoods received the 
highest ratings, and even the most affluent African American 
neighborhoods rarely qualified for lending.40  The lasting importance 
of federally subsidized homeownership was the creation of white 
suburban wealth in the post-World War II period, the benefits of 
which were largely denied to urban-dwelling people of color.41 
Urban areas were explicitly targeted with the federal government’s 
move into redevelopment under the aegis of the 1949 Housing Act.42  
The resources provided to cities as a consequence of the Act and 
subsequent legislation were generally aimed at “slum” clearance in 
the interest of urban renewal (a term used later), clearing the way for 
private investment and often resulting in the destruction of low-
income neighborhoods and the construction of luxury housing or 
large-scale facilities (e.g., hospitals, schools, or stadiums).43  In 
principle, replacement housing for the displaced was to be provided, 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See id. 
 38. See ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 55-70 (2d 
ed. 2010). 
 39. See DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED:  HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION, 
AND THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE MARKET 49 (2011) (The FHA 
“institutionalized and supported redlining . . . directing appraisers and lenders to 
place considerable emphasis on racial composition and neighborhood change.”). 
 40. See RICH BENJAMIN, SEARCHING FOR WHITOPIA 186-87 (2009). 
 41. Id. at 187 (“Home ownership through a thirty-year mortgage has long been 
the primary mechanism by which most American families created wealth.  So 
deferred home ownership opportunities have compounded economic disadvantages 
for racial minorities.”); see also JACKSON supra note 20, at 209-15. 
 42. See generally Alexander von Hoffman, A Study in Contradictions:  The 
Origins and Legacy of the Housing Act of 1949, 11 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 299 (2000). 
 43. See MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER:  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
OF URBAN RENEWAL, 1949-1962, at 93 (1964) (“[O]nly 62 per cent of the value of the 
new construction within urban renewal areas was devoted to housing, and over 90 per 
cent of the new housing built commanded monthly rents that could be afforded by 
only the tiniest fraction of those displaced.”); Herbert J. Gans, The Failure of Urban 
Renewal:  A Critique and Some Proposals, COMMENT. MAG. (Apr. 1, 1965), 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-failure-of-urban-renewal 
[https://perma.cc/9BKN-B9V5] (“[Urban renewal] has also provided inexpensive land 
for the expansion of colleges, hospitals, libraries, shopping areas, and other such 
institutions located in slum areas.”). 
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but production lagged far behind demand and relocation assistance 
was generally inadequate.44  Furthermore, the majority of those 
displaced were African American, and there is evidence that urban 
renewal worsened residential segregation.45 
1. Federal Transportation Policy Accelerates Suburbanization and 
Wreaks Urban Destruction 
Regional segregation and inequality were exacerbated by federal 
investments in interstate freeways, which dramatically accelerated 
mass suburbanization following the passage of the Federal-Aid 
Highway Act of 1956.  These systems became the backbone of 
regional expansion and significantly lowered the time cost of 
commuting from suburbs to downtown cores (at least until the growth 
they spurred created a nationwide crisis of traffic congestion).46  The 
Act provided states with a generous ninety percent federal match and 
established a Highway Trust Fund that ensured that federal gas taxes 
were dedicated exclusively to the construction of highways.47  While 
primarily intended to facilitate intercity and nationwide travel, the 
Act also funded the construction of freeways in urban areas.48  
Eisenhower Administration officials largely ignored warnings from 
engineers, planners, and urban advocates of every political persuasion 
that building freeways through dense cities would require careful, 
comprehensive planning and regard for the integrity of the existing 
urban fabric.49  Compounding foreseeable problems associated with a 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Hays notes that the availability and adequacy of replacement housing and 
relocation assistance improved in subsequent legislation. See R. ALLEN HAYS, THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING 175-77 (2012). 
 45. Gans, supra note 43 (“[B]ecause almost two-thirds of the cleared slum units 
have been occupied by Negroes, the urban renewal program has often been 
characterized as Negro clearance, and in too many cities, this has been its intent.”); 
Chester W. Hartman, Relocation:  Illusory Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REV. 
745, 797 (1971) (“[T]he general pattern is that racial minorities fare somewhat worse 
in the relocation process and that relocation does little to decrease, and on occasions 
intensifies, patterns of racial segregation.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Nathaniel Baum-Snow, Did Highways Cause Suburbanization?, 122 
Q.J. ECON. 775, 785, 801 (2007). 
 47. See MARK H. ROSE & RAYMOND A. MOHL, INTERSTATE:  HIGHWAY POLITICS 
AND POLICY SINCE 1939, at 85-94 (2012). 
 48. See ROGER BILES, THE FATE OF CITIES:  URBAN AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT, 1945-2000, at 70-81 (2011); Jeffrey R. Brown et al., Planning for Cars 
in Cities:  Planners, Engineers, and Freeways in the 20th Century, 75 J. AM. PLAN. 
ASS’N 161, 171 (2009). 
 49. See BILES, supra note 48, at 74-78; JOSEPH F.C. DIMENTO & CLIFF ELLIS, 
CHANGING LANES:  VISIONS AND HISTORIES OF URBAN FREEWAYS 107-27 (2012); 
Raymond A. Mohl, Ike and the Interstates:  Creeping Toward Comprehensive 
Planning, 2 J. PLAN. HIST. 237, 237-62 (2003). 
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lack of comprehensive planning was the fact that local officials and 
developers often used freeway construction as a tool to achieve urban 
renewal and redevelopment goals—including “slum” clearance—at 
great cost to poor and minority communities.50 
2. Increasing Citizen Participation and the Emergence of Regional 
Governance 
Federal housing and transportation policymakers attempted to 
address the new problems of central cities in the 1960s, particularly 
through the “Great Society” programs developed under President 
Lyndon B. Johnson.51  Members of the public also took action; a 
series of “freeway revolts” mobilized to stop federally funded 
bulldozers in cities across the country.52  However, many of these 
programs compounded rather than alleviated the problems of central 
cities.  For example, in many places public transit projects supported 
by the 1964 Urban Mass Transportation Act and the 1970 Urban 
Mass Transportation Assistance Act prioritized heavy rail systems 
that brought suburban commuters into downtowns but that failed to 
effectively serve increasingly isolated central city communities.53  
Service was concentrated at commute times and stops were spaced 
too far apart to be useful for local access, which meant that they had 
little to no utility for central city residents.54 
As these and other federal programs failed to address urban 
problems, community members began to demand more active 
engagement and opportunities for direct participation in decision-
making.  These demands included transportation and land use 
policy.55 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See, e.g., Raymond A. Mohl, Stop the Road:  Freeway Revolts in American 
Cities, 30 J. URB. HIST. 674, 685-87 (2004). 
 51. See, e.g., BILES, supra note 48, at 112-59 (discussing President Johnson’s 
renewed focus on urban initiatives and efforts to address problems in inner cities). 
 52. See generally Katherine M. Johnson, Captain Blake Versus the Highwaymen:  
Or, How San Francisco Won the Freeway Revolt, 8 J. PLAN. HIST. 56 (2009); Mohl, 
supra note 50; Raymond A. Mohl, The Interstates and the Cities:  The US 
Department of Transportation and the Freeway Revolt, 1966-1973, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 
193 (2008). 
 53. See, e.g., Aaron Golub et al., Race, Space, and Struggles for Mobility:  
Transportation Impacts on African Americans in Oakland and the East Bay, 34 URB. 
GEOGRAPHY 699, 710-15 (2013) (discussing struggles over transportation services 
with BART in Oakland, California). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See, e.g., Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. 
INST. PLANNERS 216, 218-29 (1969) (critiquing urban renewal); Paul Davidoff, 
Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, 31 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 331, 336 (1965) 
(discussing regional transportation needs assessments); see also DAVID AIMEN & 
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One major strategy supported by the federal government for 
addressing the emergent set of metropolitan problems during the 
1950s and 1960s involved the creation of regional transportation 
governance to better coordinate and oversee development across 
jurisdictions.56  The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 prioritized 
federal funds to transportation infrastructure that was part of a 
continuing, comprehensive, and cooperative planning process.57  It 
also required the formation of planning agencies in regions exceeding 
fifty thousand in population; their geographic extent was meant to 
capture the area expected to urbanize or the census-defined 
metropolitan statistical area.58 
Voluntary councils of government (“COGs”) initially served in this 
role, and the 1965 Urban Mass Transit Act led to their increasing 
formation.  The 1973 Federal-Aid Highway Act designated a half 
percent of all federal-aid funds for urban transportation planning to 
be conducted by MPOs, a term used for the first time in the Act.59  In 
most cases, existing COGs simply took on the additional MPO role, 
though many MPOs diversified representation to include local transit 
agencies and other sub-jurisdictions beyond those that would be 
included in a typical council of government.  These new planning 
agencies represented local interests with governing boards composed 
largely of local elected officials based on a constituent-unit model 
(i.e., one government, one vote) and a professional planning staff to 
inform decision-making.60  While showing some promise to address 
regional issues, this system merely reinforced the three important 
                                                                                                                 
ANNE MORRIS, NCHRP REPORT 710:  PRACTICAL APPROACHES FOR INVOLVING 
TRADITIONALLY UNDERSERVED POPULATIONS IN TRANSPORTATION 
DECISIONMAKING 1-6 (2012) (“Greater citizen activism and public opposition to the 
urban highway construction program and its destructive social consequences began to 
emerge in the latter half of the 1960s, leading to new political pressures to critically 
evaluate and reform the relationship between agencies making transportation 
decisions and the affected public.”). 
 56. EDWARD WEINER, URBAN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  HISTORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 32-33 (3d ed. 2008). 
 57. Id. 
 58. 23 U.S.C. § 134(e)(2) (2015) (“Each metropolitan planning area (A) shall 
encompass at least the existing urbanized area and the contiguous area expected to 
become urbanized within a 20-year forecast period for the transportation plan; and 
(B) may encompass the entire metropolitan statistical area or consolidated 
metropolitan statistical area, as defined by the Bureau of the Census.”). 
 59. WEINER, supra note 56, at 79; PAUL G. LEWIS & MARY SPRAGUE, PUB. POL’Y 
INST. CAL., FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY AND THE ROLE OF MPOS IN 
CALIFORNIA 31 (1997). 
 60. Paul G. Lewis, Regionalism and Representation, 33 URB. AFF. REV. 839, 841 
(1998) (“[M]any COGs and other regional entities have operated on a one-
government, one-vote basis.”). 
2017] INEQUALITY IN METRO REGIONS 1029 
drivers of inequality:  unrepresentative governance, unequal access to 
opportunities, and unfair distribution of benefits and burdens as 
suburban jurisdictions were overrepresented (per capita) while 
central cities, containing larger minority and low-income populations, 
went underrepresented.61 
An MPO’s internal structure can limit its willingness to embrace 
policies and practices that would result in regionally dispersed 
benefits.  In principle, MPOs control project selection by including, or 
excluding, a project in the long-range transportation plan (“LRTP”) 
or transportation improvement programs (“TIP”).62  In practice, 
because of constituent-unit representation on boards, such choices 
can be influenced by political strategy.  Local elected officials may not 
reject or challenge the projects of other board members in one 
planning cycle, in hopes that their project will receive similarly 
favorable reception in the next cycle.63  In this environment, MPOs 
rarely challenge projects proposed by local sponsors and effectively 
eschew their role as gatekeeper of federal and state funds.  There is 
empirical evidence for this tradeoff; when regional representation 
(including persons other than locally elected officials) increases on 
the MPO board, support for regional projects also increases.64 
C. Regional Planning Strengthened, but Too Little Too Late? 
The specific objectives of MPOs have shifted over time from simply 
aggregating projects proposed by local governments to preparing 
LRTPs and TIPs.  After a period of decreasing relevance during the 
1980s,65 federal transportation reauthorization bills again tended to 
elevate the power and responsibilities of MPOs in the 1990s.66  In 
1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Thomas W. Sanchez & James Wolf, Environmental Justice and 
Transportation Equity:  A Review of MPOs., in GROWING SMARTER:  ACHIEVING 
LIVABLE COMMUNITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, AND REGIONAL EQUITY 249, 263-
67 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 2007). 
 62. See 49 U.S.C. § 5303 (2016) (containing various sections on MPO 
responsibilities regarding planning and project definition requirements for federal 
funding). 
 63. See ROSAN, supra note 11. 
 64. Elizabeth R. Gerber & Clark C. Gibson, Balancing Regionalism and 
Localism:  How Institutions and Incentives Shape American Transportation Policy, 
53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 633, 642 (2009). 
 65. Bruce D. McDowell, The Metropolitan Planning Organization Role in the 
1980s, 18 J. ADVANCED TRANSP. 125, 128-31 (1984). 
 66. ELISA BARBOUR, PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL., METROPOLITAN GROWTH PLANNING 
IN CALIFORNIA, 1900-2000, at 75-91 (2002); LEWIS & SPRAGUE, supra note 59, at 2-3, 
49-52. 
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(“ISTEA”) put forth fourteen “planning factors,” establishing the 
broader range of areas to be considered by MPOs and the influence 
of the transportation system on societal goals.67  It also gave MPOs 
direct control over some funds for the first time, tightly integrated 
transportation and air quality planning, and encouraged additional 
collaboration between MPOs, state-level agencies, non-profit 
organizations, and the public.68 
ISTEA also established new requirements for long-range planning, 
as well as direct allocation of federal funding in metropolitan areas 
with more than two hundred thousand residents.69  Approximately 
half of the officially designated MPOs are also COGs.70  Whether or 
not an MPO is also a COG, constituent-unit representation is still 
very popular; sometimes additional representatives for larger cities 
are added to a board to mitigate their underrepresentation.71  It is 
largely held by transportation scholars that the lack of 
representativeness of MPO boards poses a substantial issue, and 
prevents them from having any real power as a governing body at the 
regional level.72  Suburban bias, which favors highways over transit, 
continues to be a problem.73 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See LEWIS & SPRAGUE, supra note 59, at 50.  Specifically, the metropolitan 
planning process shall provide for consideration of projects and strategies that will, 
among other things, address economic vitality, safety, accessibility and mobility, 
environmental protection, energy conservation, and “consistency between 
transportation improvements and State and local planned growth and economic 
development patterns.” 23 U.S.C. § 134(h)(1)(E) (2012).  The LRTP, in addition, 
must “emphasize the preservation of the existing transportation system.” Id. 
§ 134(h)(1)(H). 
 68. See, e.g., Todd Goldman & Elizabeth Deakin, Regionalism Through 
Partnerships? Metropolitan Planning Since ISTEA, 14 BERKELEY PLAN. J. 46-48 
(2000) (describing the changes in MPO responsibilities pre- and post-ISTEA). 
 69. See NAT’L TRANSP. LIBRARY, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., INTERMODAL SURFACE 
TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY ACT OF 1991—SUMMARY 14, http://ntl.bts.gov/
DOCS/ste.html [https://perma.cc/8PSS-BKDK]. 
 70. See James F. Wolf & Tara Kolar Bryan, Identifying the Capacities of 
Regional Councils of Government, 41 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 61, 63 (2009); Regional 
Councils, COGs & MPOs, NAT’L ASS’N REGIONAL COUNCILS (2013), http://narc.org/
about-narc/cogs-mpos [https://perma.cc/PM7Q-XNLT]. 
 71. Goldman & Deakin, supra note 68, at 50; Lewis, supra note 60, at 846-50 
(discussing and providing quantitative evidence of the malapportionment of COGs 
based on a survey of California agencies). 
 72. Goldman & Deakin, supra note 68, at 50; Lewis, supra note 60, at 851. 
 73. See, e.g., Arthur Nelson et al., Metropolitan Planning Organization Voting 
Structure and Transit Investment Bias:  Preliminary Analysis with Social Equity 
Implications, 1895 TRANSP. RES. REC. 1, 5-6 (2004) (finding suburban bias in MPO 
board members is associated with reduced funding for public transit). 
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Post-ISTEA, MPOs are tasked with adopting and periodically 
updating long-range regional transportation plans and short-term 
TIPs.  The LRTP is a comprehensive document that covers a planning 
horizon of at least twenty years, articulates transportation systems 
goals, and meets a range of substantive and procedural requirements, 
including public involvement and environmental review.74 
MPOs are expected to develop performance measures and targets, 
and must show how the plan will meet those targets.75  Specifically, 
MPOs must produce data described in sufficient detail to develop cost 
estimates and to address potential environmental mitigation activities 
that may be required for project development.76  The plan must also 
be based on reasonable estimates of financial resources available over 
the planning period,77 and should reflect consultation with 
appropriate agencies responsible for land use management, 
environmental protection, and historic preservation.78  The plan is 
updated every five years (or four years in areas out of attainment for 
clean air standards).79 
The TIP is a short-term programming document that links projects 
to specific sources of local, regional, state, and federal funds;80 all 
projects desiring federal funding must appear in the TIP and be 
consistent with a long-range transportation plan.81  The TIP lists 
projects to be constructed over a four-year period, and is updated 
every four years.  State departments of transportation aggregate all 
TIPs adopted within their state into a statewide transportation 
improvement program (“STIP”) that also includes rural projects that 
are typically planned and programmed by that department.82 
As with all recipients of federal funding, MPO decision-making is 
subject to federal oversight and regulation.83  One significant set of 
requirements includes public involvement in the planning process; at 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See Development and Content of the Metropolitan Transportation Plan, 23 
C.F.R. § 450.324 (2017). 
 75. See id. § 450.324(g)(4). 
 76. See id. § 450.324(g)(9)-(10). 
 77. See id. § 450.324(g)(11)(i). 
 78. See id. § 450.324(h). 
 79. See id. § 450.324(d). 
 80. Development and Content of the Transportation Improvement Program 
(TIP), 23 C.F.R. § 450.326 (2017). 
 81. Development and Content of the Statewide Transportation Improvement 
Program (STIP), 23 C.F.R. § 450.218(h) (2017). 
 82. TIP Revisions and Relationship to the STIP, 23 C.F.R. § 450.328 (2017). 
 83. See, e.g., 23 C.F.R. § 450.300 (2017) (setting forth the policy and purposes of 
MPO decision-making). 
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the outset of each planning cycle, the MPO must adopt a public 
participation plan which, at a minimum, must describe explicit 
strategies and desired outcomes for seeking out and considering the 
needs of low-income and minority households.84  MPOs must produce 
“[a] description of the procedures by which the mobility needs of 
minority populations are identified and considered within the 
planning process” that is submitted to the Federal Transit 
Administration (“FTA”) as part of a Title VI (of the Civil Rights 
Act) Program compliance document.85  Neither the Federal Highway 
Administration (“FHWA”) nor FTA, two agencies of the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (“DOT”) that promulgate MPO-
related guidance, have specified the mechanisms for ensuring that 
plans address and identify the needs of minority populations, even 
though they amended their MPO planning regulation in 2016 and had 
previously promised more guidance.86 
Further, at the conclusion of the planning process, MPOs must self-
certify their compliance with all applicable federal requirements.87  In 
particular, MPOs must certify that the metropolitan transportation 
planning process was carried out in accordance with Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.88  Following each MPO planning cycle, 
FHWA and FTA conduct a joint review to ensure that certification 
has been properly made.89 
Regardless of their increasing responsibilities under federal law, an 
MPO’s effect is still typically limited to planning; MPOs have no 
                                                                                                                 
 84. See Interested Parties, Participation, and Consultation, 23 C.F.R. 
§ 450.316(a)(1) (2017).  The federal obligation does not end with adopting a plan for 
outreach and integration of the voices of low-income and minority residents; it also 
extends to “[p]eriodically reviewing the effectiveness of the procedures and strategies 
contained in the participation plan to ensure a full and open participation process.” 
Id. § 450.316(a)(1)(x).  MPOs must also, as part of a required Title VI program, not 
only submit a public participation plan that includes an outreach plan to engage 
minority and limited English proficient populations, but also “a summary of outreach 
efforts made since the last Title VI Program submission.” FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF TRANSP., CIRCULAR 4702.1B, TITLE VI REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES 
FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION RECIPIENTS, at ch. III, § 4(a)(4) (2012) 
[hereinafter FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B]. 
 85. FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra note 84, at ch. VI, § 2(a)(3).  Title VI 
background requirements are discussed in greater detail in Section III.A infra. 
 86. See 49 C.F.R. § 21.21(b) (2017) (“The Secretary shall issue . . . instructions 
and procedures for effectuating this part.”). 
 87. Each MPO must “certify . . . that the metropolitan transportation planning 
process is being carried out in accordance with . . . Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.” 23 C.F.R. § 450.336(a); see also FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra note 84, at ch. 
VI, § 3. 
 88. 23 C.F.R. § 450.336(a). 
 89. See FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra note 84, at ch. VI, § 2. 
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jurisdiction over land use, nor transportation facilities; instead, they 
serve mostly to pass funding through to their sub-jurisdictions.90  
Transportation expert Todd Goldman has highlighted the constraints 
faced by MPOs, stating that they “act primarily to accommodate the 
decisions already made by a complex constellation of higher- and 
lower-level governments,”91 though those responsibilities can vary by 
location.92 
These drawbacks notwithstanding, MPOs emerged from ISTEA as 
key decision-making bodies in determining how to balance 
investment among modes at the regional level—including between 
central cities and suburbs—selecting from among eligible projects and 
distributing federal funding to local governments based on criteria of 
their own determination.  Therefore, the regional planning apparatus 
remains a key focus of advocacy for regional equity. 
II.  REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLANNING DRIVES INEQUALITY 
Despite the limits that local control places on regional planning 
efforts, there is much at stake in MPO planning, as these agencies are 
the only regional decision-making bodies in most metropolitan areas, 
and thus, the only venue for conversations about regional equity, 
investment priorities, and conflict resolution.  MPOs are also 
expected to bring together a realistic vision of future transportation 
investments, land use, and housing that reflects local priorities and 
plans.  Further, the amount of spending embodied in plans and 
programs is substantial.93  They can determine the relative shares of 
funding devoted to preservation and maintenance of existing facilities 
compared to capital expansion, as well as the balance of funding 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See Goldman & Deakin, supra note 68, at 52. 
 91. Todd Goldman, Transportation Tax Ballot Initiatives as Regional Planning 
Processes, 1997 TRANSP. RES. REC. 9, 10 (2007). 
 92. Some MPOs have revenue collection responsibilities and have a more 
significant role in funding decisions (e.g., MTC of the Bay Area or MAG in the 
Phoenix metro area), while others do not touch any funds but merely serve as a 
conduit for funds through their planning decisions (e.g., Portland Metro). 
 93. A brief review of LRTPs shows a wide range of total plan spending—from 
lows of about a quarter billion dollars per million population per year to well over 
one billion dollars per million population per year. See HOUSTON-GALVESTON AREA 
COUNCIL, BRIDGING OUR COMMUNITIES:  2040 RTP (2016); MARICOPA ASS’N OF 
GOV’TS, DRAFT 2040 REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN (2017); S. CAL. ASS’N OF 
GOV’TS, THE 2016-2040 REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION PLAN/SUSTAINABLE 
COMMUNITIES STRATEGY (2016); see also Foxx, supra note 12 (discussing regional 
transportation spending). 
1034 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
dedicated to highways and public transportation.  Additionally, 
MPOs have to conduct an “equity analysis” of their plans.94 
By shaping investments and assessing equity, MPOs can confront 
the three important drivers of inequality:  unrepresentative 
governance, unequal access to opportunities, and unfair distribution 
of benefits and burdens.  This Part discusses how MPO planning 
relates to each of these three drivers and offers Plan Bay Area 
(“PBA”), as an example to illustrate the connections between 
planning and outcomes in practice.  PBA was the 2013 regional 
transportation plan for the San Francisco Bay Area.95  Through 
engagement with planning processes, advocates for regional equity 
and environmental justice simultaneously improved democratic 
governance, sought increased access to opportunities, and challenged 
the MPO’s preferred distribution of benefits and burdens. 
A. Governance 
While MPO governance and representation issues were discussed 
at some length in Section I.B.2 above, this Section highlights how 
differences in governance can affect regional equity outcomes.  
Specifically, whether an MPO board represents its region in terms of 
demographics and the nature of an MPO’s public outreach activities 
can affect the degree to which an agency’s activities will tend to push 
a region toward or away from equitable outcomes. 
Although MPOs undertake many tasks, they must produce and 
regularly update LRTPs and TIPs to maintain eligibility for federal 
funding.96  There is no set way to produce a plan; sometimes they 
form by aggregating local priorities, or sometimes by identifying 
regional priorities.  The governance structure of most MPOs pushes 
agencies towards local aggregation, but meaningful and effective 
public involvement tends to push in the opposite direction.  In some 
cases, MPOs have looked beyond federal mandates to create 
additional opportunities for engagement on particular issues.  With 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See OFF. OF THE SEC’Y OF TRANSP., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT-OST-2012-
0044, UPDATED ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 5610.2(A) §7(a) (2012) 
[hereinafter UPDATED DOT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 5610.2(A)]. 
 95. See generally METRO. TRANSP. COMM’N & ASS’N OF BAY AREA GOV’TS, 
DRAFT PLAN BAY AREA:  STRATEGY FOR A SUSTAINABLE REGION (2013) 
[hereinafter DRAFT PLAN BAY AREA]. 
 96. See Scope of the Metropolitan Transportation Planning Process, 23 C.F.R. 
§ 450.306(a) (“[M]etropolitan planning organizations . . . shall develop long-range 
transportation plans and TIPs.”); Id. § 450.306(b) (“The metropolitan transportation 
planning process shall be continuous, cooperative, and comprehensive . . . .”). 
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increased public engagement, MPOs are becoming important sites for 
activism and advocacy.97 
Scenario development is one place where tension arises between 
aggregation and innovation, as it explores alternative futures that 
could result from varying policies and practices.98  A status quo 
aggregation scenario, for example, could maintain historical levels of 
funding for each transportation mode and not seek to shift the 
landscape of opportunity by envisioning different land use 
configurations.  A more ambitious scenario might propose investing 
heavily in public transit, reducing highway expenditures, and siting 
affordable housing in high-opportunity areas.99  The status quo plan 
might meet the MPO’s legal requirements but not reflect the desires 
of the public. 
In general, public agencies tend to focus on strict legal compliance 
in terms of public engagement, but they may be pressured by 
communities to expand their efforts; this can have both normative 
and pragmatic benefits.100  Normative benefits arise when 
marginalized groups participate in the decision-making processes; 
these include increased trust, empowerment, and mutual knowledge 
creation and social learning.  Pragmatic benefits include improved 
quality of decisions made, context sensitivity, and the ability to 
promote a truly regional perspective and regional solutions to 
ongoing problems of inequity.101 
B. Access to Opportunities 
Because individuals generally must travel to reach their desired 
destinations, mobility and access are a precondition for participating 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 19, at 95-98; Richard A. Marcantonio & Alex 
Karner, Disadvantaged Communities Teach Regional Planners a Lesson in Equitable 
and Sustainable Development, 23 POVERTY & RACE 5, 5, 7, 12 (2014); see also infra 
Section II.D. 
 98. Lew Villotti & W. Kirk Brethauer, Predicting the Future?, PUB. ROADS 
(Sept./Oct. 2013), https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/13sepoct/04.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/B95P-7ZDK]. 
 99. See, e.g., Alex Karner et al., Putting Data into Action for Regional Equity in 
California’s San Joaquin Valley, in WHAT COUNTS:  HARNESSING DATA FOR 
AMERICA’S COMMUNITIES 272, 272-76 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F. & Urban Inst. eds., 
2014) (describing examples from practice where such innovative community-defined 
scenarios have been proposed); Sherman L. Lewis III, Land Use and Transportation:  
Envisioning Regional Sustainability, 5 TRANSP. POL’Y 147, 148-51 (1998); 
Marcantonio & Karner, supra note 97, at 5-7, 12. 
 100. See AIMEN & MORRIS, supra note 55; Mark S. Reed, Stakeholder 
Participation for Environmental Management:  A Literature Review, 141 
BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 2417, 2418-21 (2008). 
 101. See Reed, supra note 100. 
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in critical, life-enhancing activities such as employment, education, 
health care, and social contact.102  Indeed, the relationship between 
job location, mobility, and employment outcomes was a significant 
social problem and important driver of the urban protests of the mid-
1960s.103  In a major study of the issue, the Brookings Institution 
found that low rates of car ownership and inadequate public transit 
kept job seekers in the urban core from reaching jobs in regions 
across the United States.104  The study highlighted important factors 
including job decentralization, continued concentration of low-
income families in central city areas, and poor central city-suburban 
transit connectivity.105  Other work has investigated land use, showing 
that areas with high concentrations of low-wage jobs often have a 
dearth of housing that would be affordable to workers employed in 
those jobs.106 
Access to opportunity is directly affected by MPO planning 
because the scenarios it contemplates provide varying degrees of 
access to populations dispersed across a region.  On the other hand, 
alternative land use policies tied into LRTPs that, for example, 
challenge exclusionary zoning practices to allow more affordable 
housing development in high-opportunity suburban areas, can 
enhance access without transportation investments.107  Plans that 
incorporate both transportation and land use to improve access can 
significantly enhance the lives of regional populations. 
                                                                                                                 
 102. AM. ASS’N OF ST. HIGHWAY & TRANSP. OFFICIALS, COMMUTING IN AMERICA 
2013 BRIEF 2:  THE NATIONAL REPORT ON COMMUTING PATTERNS AND TRENDS 6-7 
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4-5 (2003). 
 105. See id. 
 106. Chris Benner & Alex Karner, Low-Wage Jobs-Housing Fit:  Identifying 
Locations of Affordable Housing Shortages, 37 URB. GEOGRAPHY 883, 893-99 
(2016). 
 107. For example, the TRANSDEF “Smart Growth” scenario was tested as part of 
the 2005 LRTP analysis for the San Francisco Bay Area.  It performed better in terms 
of congestion, emissions, and open space preservation than their preferred scenario. 
See The TRANSDEF Smart Growth Alternative, TRANSP. SOLUTIONS DEF. & EDUC. 
FUND, http://transdef.org/RTP/RTP.html [https://perma.cc/ZV3A-PEUJ]. 
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C. Benefits and Burdens of Investments 
While mobility and access to opportunities are likely to be the most 
important benefits of transportation investments,108 others include 
health benefits from improved travel by foot and bicycle and 
increased values for private property located near new 
infrastructure.109  Aside from certain burdens like regional air 
pollution and climate change, which are felt by widely dispersed 
populations, most burdens are localized, such as health impacts 
resulting from near-roadway air pollution, or displacement pressures 
due to development.  Physical displacement sometimes results when 
housing is removed to make way for infrastructure, and economic 
displacement can result from how changes in access induce changes in 
local property markets (e.g., intensifying development via 
gentrification, or slowing development leading to disinvestment).110 
Historically, the benefits of transportation investments have 
accrued to those who are already mobile and the burdens have fallen 
disproportionately on low-income people and people of color.  Since 
status quo automobile-based planning tends to focus on central city-
suburb and suburb-suburb movements, or on solving congestion 
problems on key travel corridors, it is whiter and wealthier 
communities that reap its benefits.111  This also means that such 
suburban-central city commuters, who are the most mobile and make 
the greatest demands on roads, will benefit most from future 
investments.112 
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Through Job Access and Reverse-Commute Programs, in RUNNING ON EMPTY:  
TRANSPORT, SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (Karen Lucas ed., 
2004); Robert A. Johnston, The Urban Transportation Planning Process, in THE 
GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 115, 115-30 (Susan Hanson & Genevieve 
Giuliano eds., 3d ed. 2004); THOMAS W. SANCHEZ ET AL., MOVING TO EQUITY:  
ADDRESSING INEQUITABLE EFFECTS OF TRANSPORTATION POLICIES ON MINORITIES 
(2003). 
 112. See, e.g., Karel Martens, Basing Transport Planning on Principles of Social 
Justice, 19 BERKELEY PLAN. J. 1, 3-7 (2006). 
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Investments in public transportation also present unique equity 
challenges.  Depending on location and configuration, different 
systems will benefit different types of users.113  Commuter-oriented 
rail and express bus systems typically draw a higher income clientele 
because of their peak period orientation and the location of key stops 
in suburban areas.114  On the other hand, in most regions, local urban 
transit services (mostly bus, but sometimes light rail) typically provide 
the workhorse connectivity required to meet daily travel needs for 
those without automobiles.115  Local bus service, though vitally 
important, is often not high quality.  In most places, this system 
persists so that transit-dependent populations are afforded a minimal 
level of service by bus while regional congestion, air quality, and 
climate change goals can be addressed through investments in rail 
modes.116  The bifurcation of benefits from public transport, however, 
can lead to tensions when funding gets shuffled between services for 
low-income groups and for higher-income commuters.117 
D. Case Study:  Plan Bay Area and the “Six Wins” Coalition for 
Social Equity 
The San Francisco Bay Area’s 2013 RTP update demonstrates the 
degree to which MPO processes can affect regional equity outcomes.  
The RTP, entitled Plan Bay Area, was the first in the region to 
require a sustainable communities strategy (“SCS”) to reduce future 
greenhouse gas emissions as required under SB 375.118  This 
requirement offered an opportunity to address longstanding issues of 
regional equity by focusing investments in the densest parts of the 
region, where public transit is most viable and substantial 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See, e.g., Mark Garrett & Brian Taylor, Reconsidering Social Equity in Public 
Transit, 13 BERKELEY PLAN. J. 6, 7, 11-13 (1999); Brian D. Taylor & Eric A. Morris, 
Public Transportation Objectives and Rider Demographics:  Are Transit’s Priorities 
Poor Public Policy?, 42 TRANSP. 347, 353-60 (2015). 
 114. See generally Joe Grengs, Community-Based Planning as a Source of Political 
Change:  The Transit Equity Movement of Los Angeles’ Bus Riders Union, 68 J. AM. 
PLAN. ASS’N 165, 169 (2002); Eric Mann, Los Angeles Bus Riders Derail the MTA, in 
HIGHWAY ROBBERY:  TRANSPORTATION RACISM AND NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY 33, 
33-48 (Robert Bullard et al. eds., 2004). 
 115. Buses carry about twenty percent more passengers than rail systems do 
nationally, and most of that total rail ridership is concentrated into just a few cities. 
See BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TABLE 2-1 U.S. PASSENGER-
MILES TRAVELED BY MODE:  2000, 2010 AND 2014, https://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/
publications/passenger_travel_2016/tables/table2_1 [https://perma.cc/YGE7-4JDM]. 
 116. Garrett & Taylor, supra note 113, at 18-23; Taylor & Morris, supra note 113, 
at 362-65. 
 117. Grengs, supra note 114, at 166-70. 
 118. DRAFT PLAN BAY AREA, supra note 95, at 3. 
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concentrations of people of color and low-income people still 
reside.119  Still, the ultimate outcomes for those populations were not 
clear-cut, as public transit investments can also increase property 
values and spark gentrification and displacement.120 
The Metropolitan Transportation Commission (“MTC”) and the 
Association of Bay Area Governments (“ABAG”), the agencies 
responsible for adopting the plan, appeared to place equity and 
meaningful participation at the center of their process.  In 2010, the 
agencies applied for a grant to support outreach and engagement,121 
and formed groups of equity stakeholders to support SCS 
development.122  The apparent commitment to equity opened an 
opportunity for policy advocates to partner with community groups to 
create a regional transportation investment and land use plan that 
would put the needs of disadvantaged communities first.  The “Six 
Wins” for social equity network was launched at an October 2010 
retreat to develop a strategy to advance equity principles in SB 375 
planning.123 
In June 2011, when MTC and ABAG released five staff-developed 
alternative scenarios, Six Wins immediately issued its alternative 
equity-focused plan, the Equity, Environment, and Jobs (“EEJ”) 
scenario.124  The agencies initially refused to analyze the EEJ 
alternative against those developed by staff, and no components of 
the EEJ were included in the final “preferred alternative” developed 
by the agencies.  Continued Six Wins advocacy, including quantitative 
analyses, written comments, outreach with elected officials, and high 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Id. at 5. 
 120. See generally Ghebreegziabiher Debrezion et al., The Impact of Railway 
Stations on Residential and Commercial Property Value:  A Meta-Analysis, 35 J. 
REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 161, 177-78 (2007) (demonstrating the effect of public transit 
on property values.); Noah Quastel, Political Ecologies of Gentrification, 30 URB. 
GEOGRAPHY 694, 711-14 (2009) (demonstrating that the principles of smart growth—
compact, walkable communities well-served by public transit—can facilitate 
gentrification.). 
 121. See DRAFT PLAN BAY AREA, supra note 95, at 5; see also METRO. TRANSP. 
COMM’N, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PLAN FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 2 (2010) 
(In their application, the agencies described their plans to engage equity advocates 
during SCS development and use funds to support public engagement efforts in 
disadvantaged communities.). 
 122. Memorandum from Ann Flemer, Deputy Exec. Dir. for Pol’y, Metro. Transp. 
Comm., & Ezra Rapport, Exec. Dir., Ass’n of Bay Area Gov’ts, to MTC Plan. 
Comm. & ABAG Admin. Comm., Re:  Plan Bay Area:  Alternative Scenarios (July 
6, 2011) (on file with authors). 
 123. Marcantonio & Karner, supra note 97, at 7. 
 124. Id. 
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attendance at public meetings, led to the EEJ’s analysis during the 
environmental review process.125 
Despite outperforming the agency’s preferred plan on key 
metrics—including greenhouse gas emissions, trips made by walking 
and public transit, and air pollution emissions—the EEJ was not 
adopted as the preferred scenario.126  But sustained advocacy and the 
alternative’s performance led to the adoption of three amendments 
that bode well for the future.  These include a commitment to 
increasing transit funding, protecting against displacement via 
restrictions embedded in the OBAG program, and allocating cap-
and-trade revenues such that twenty-five percent of the anticipated 
three billion dollars truly benefit disadvantaged communities.127 
These amendments, and the momentum generated by the advocacy 
effort, demonstrate the relationship between MPO planning and the 
three drivers of inequality.  Specifically, the amendments hold out the 
promise that disadvantaged communities in the Bay Area will enjoy 
increased access to opportunities and a more equitable distribution of 
the benefits and burdens of investments in the future.  They were also 
driven in part by the governance structure at the agencies that 
elevated the importance of public engagement as well as the sustained 
commitment of advocacy organizations and members of the public. 
III.  LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING EQUITY IN REGIONAL 
PLANNING 
MPOs must do more than avoid or reduce discrimination; they 
must also proactively analyze and address the conditions of 
inequality.  An MPO’s affirmative obligations to address equity 
emerge from three sources:  Title VI regulations, the EJ Executive 
Order, and the Fair Housing Act.128  This Part describes these broad 
legal frameworks that shape MPO equity obligations and the 
shortcomings thereof.  It sets up a more detailed discussion about the 
MPO equity analysis in Part IV. 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. 
 126. Metro. Transp. Comm. & Ass’n of Bay Area Gov’ts, Draft of Plan Bay Area 
Environmental Impact Report, State Clearinghouse No. 2012062029 (comparing the 
performance of alternative scenarios using a simulation model of land use and travel 
behavior that can generate estimates of travel behavior, congestion, and air pollution 
in a future year). 
 127. Marcantonio & Karner, supra note 97, at 12. 
 128. These obligations apply not only to MPOs, but to other entities like transit 
agencies and state departments of transportation. 
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A. Title VI:  Affirmative Obligations and Judicial Enforcement 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 broadly prohibits a wide 
range of discriminatory policies and practices.129  An entity receiving 
any federal funding is subject to Title VI, which prohibits the 
exclusion from or denial of benefits of federally funded programs (or 
programs receiving any amount of federal money) on the basis of 
race, color, or national origin.130  Thus, MPOs are subject to Title VI’s 
prohibition of discrimination because they receive federal support for 
their activities.  Local and regional transportation agencies subject to 
MPO authority may also be subject to Title VI if they receive federal 
funds.131 
Title VI also provides for administrative oversight and 
enforcement.  Because it is the “sleeping giant” of civil rights 
statutes,132 Title VI grants federal agencies providing financial 
assistance the oversight authority to “effectuate [the law’s] 
provisions . . . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general 
applicability,”133 and also provides for enforcement actions and 
remedies in individual cases.134  The DOT is one of the federal 
agencies charged with oversight authority.135  Regulations 
promulgated by the DOT incorporate the language of Title VI by 
requiring federal funds recipients to take prompt measures to ensure 
no person is denied participation in, or the benefits of, its programs 
due to race, color, or national origin, and to comply with process 
requirements when collecting and evaluating data and forming their 
plans.136 
While affirmative obligations have not played the game-changing 
role that earlier generations of civil rights advocates had argued 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Note that this prohibits any form of discriminatory practice or impact, as 
opposed to, for example, the Fair Housing Act or Title VII, which enumerate 
categories of prohibited discrimination. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person shall on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
 131. Id. § 2000d-4a (defining “program or activity” for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135 (West 2017). 
 132. Jerett Yan, Rousing the Sleeping Giant:  Administrative Enforcement of Title 
VI and New Routes to Equity in Transit Planning, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1131, 1134 
(2013). 
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
 134. Id. § 2000d-7. 
 135. See CAL. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TITLE VI PROGRAM PLAN 66-68 (2016), 
http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/bep/title_vi/documents/Title6PgmPlan1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q43J-Y7BC]. 
 136. Id. 
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for,137 they remain an important subtext in our civil rights law and in 
how they pertain to MPO activities.  Affirmative assurances and 
obligations, at a minimum, require that MPOs not simply avoid 
discrimination but evaluate the potential for discrimination in their 
programs and activities in a prophylactic manner.  They can 
reasonably be read as creating a buffer zone of protection to ensure 
that the potential for discrimination is identified and averted before it 
becomes actual.  For example, the DOT’s Title VI regulation includes 
important affirmative obligations, such as the obligation to remove or 
overcome the effects of discrimination where “prior discriminatory 
practice” existed,138 or “[e]ven in the absence of prior discriminatory 
practice . . . . to take affirmative action” to ensure no future 
discrimination occurs.139  The regulation also requires that entities 
seeking federal assistance self-certify compliance with these 
requirements, provide adequate detail about their “method of 
administration,” and give a “reasonable guarantee” that programs 
will meet the requirements.140  Entities must make available 
“compliance reports” that include racial and ethnic data showing the 
extent to which they are beneficiaries of programs receiving federal 
funding—in sum, a rudimentary equity analysis.141 
Judicial enforcement of Title VI became much more difficult in 
2001 when the United States Supreme Court decided Alexander v. 
Sandoval, a challenge to Alabama’s English-only driver’s license 
examination.142  A five-justice majority decided that while Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law:  The View from 1989, 64 TUL. L. 
REV. 1407, 1407-09 (1989).  Perhaps the most substantive example of an affirmative 
obligation is the requirement, in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 
§ 701 et seq.) and the Americans with Disability Act (42 U.S.C. § 12111) that 
employers, housing providers, and others make reasonable accommodations to the 
disability of their employees, applicants, and tenants. 
 138. 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(7). 
 139. Id.  Stating that “[t]he Secretary of Transportation’s regulation more broadly 
requires the recipients of federal funds to take ‘affirmative action to assure that no 
person is excluded from participation’ in a federally funded program ‘[e]ven in the 
absence of prior discriminatory practice or usage,’” the California Supreme Court 
ruled that “[t]he unmistakable import of this language is not that race-based remedies 
are required, but simply that they are permitted, so far as the Secretary is concerned, 
if no other law precludes them.” Coral Constr. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 235 P.3d 947, 
962 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 140. 49 C.F.R. § 21.7(b). 
 141. See 49 C.F.R. § 21.9(b) (requiring both primary recipients and subrecipients 
to maintain compliance reports that include “racial and ethnic data showing the 
extent to which members of minority groups are beneficiaries of programs receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”). 
 142. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
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intended to create an implied private right of action for Title VI, that 
right protected only against intentional discrimination and not 
disparate impact claims.143  With this ruling, the Court imposed a 
prohibitive standard of proof on individuals and advocacy groups 
seeking to enforce Title IV through private litigation. 
In some places, state law analogues to Title VI144 still support 
disparate impact claims by private plaintiffs.145  Even before 
Sandoval, other cases indicated that disparate impact cases would be 
met by skeptical courts.  One such case in the transportation context 
was the Second Circuit case Urban League v. New York.146  At issue 
was the allocation of resources between modes by the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority (“MTA”), which determined the balance 
between operating subsidies and fare revenue for mass transit systems 
in the New York region.147  The plaintiffs showed that riders of buses 
and subways, who were predominately minority residents of New 
York City, paid a much higher proportion of system operating costs 
than did the passengers of commuter rail systems, nearly all of whom 
were white.148  Plaintiffs sought an injunction against proposed fare 
increases that would increase this cost disparity by raising bus and 
subway fares by twenty percent while raising commuter rail fares by 
only eight and a half percent.149  Though the district court found for 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Id. at 291.  The Court was willing to “assume for the purposes of deciding this 
case” that regulations adopted on its authority “may validly proscribe activities that 
have a disparate impact on racial groups” which may be enforced through 
administrative action. Id. at 281.  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, was not 
willing to extend that assumption to the implied private right of action, however, and 
interpreted the statute to mean that Congress had only intended to prohibit 
intentional discrimination. Id. at 291. 
 144. See e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135 (Deering 2017). 
 145. See, e.g., Munguia v. Ill., No. 10 C 0055, 2010 WL 3172740, at *11 (N.D. Ill. 
Aug. 11, 2010) (finding no showing of discriminatory impacts under Illinois law in a 
case challenging funding disparities between rail transit systems in wealthy suburban 
communities versus poor minority communities); Crenshaw Subway Coal. v. L.A. 
Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. CV 11-9603 FMO (JCx), 2015 WL 6150847, at *38 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2015) (finding no prima facie showing of discriminatory impact 
under California civil rights statutes in considering a plan for light rail construction 
through an African American business corridor); see also Darensburg v. Metro. 
Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 994 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009). 
 146. N.Y. Urb. League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 147. Id. at 1033-38. 
 148. The district court had noted that about fifty-four percent of bus and subway 
riders were people of color, while about eighty percent of commuter rail users were 
white. See N.Y. Urb. League, Inc. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 905 F. Supp. 1266, 1271-72 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 149. Id. at 1268. 
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the plaintiffs, the decision was overturned on appeal.150  The appellate 
court found the plaintiff’s metrics insufficient and was persuaded by 
the MTA’s justifications, including the reduction of traffic and 
pollution and stimulus resulting from greater subsidies for suburban 
commuters.151 
Another case exemplifying the challenge of addressing 
metropolitan inequality through a disparate impact framework is 
Darensburg v. Metropolitan Transportation Commission,152 the most 
recent Title VI case brought in federal court against an MPO.  The 
Darensburg plaintiffs argued a disparate impact theory under a state 
law claim that mirrored Title VI and its interpretation prior to 
Sandoval.153  Silvia Darensburg and Vivian Hain, two bus riders of 
color, represented a class of bus riders of AC Transit, a large bus 
transit system serving Oakland, California, and two surrounding East 
Bay counties.154  They claimed that MTC, in its funding decisions, 
favored two regional rail systems over the urban bus systems like AC 
Transit.155  They also objected that BART passengers, who were 
disproportionately white and affluent, were subsidized at a rate of 
$6.14 per trip compared to $2.78 per trip for AC Transit riders.156  
Plaintiffs highlighted a long pattern of bus service cuts as rail service 
expanded; AC Transit service basically stagnated after the late 1970s, 
while BART service more than tripled, even though BART ridership 
did not exceed AC Transit until around 1990.  At the heart of their 
claim was that MTC had created and maintained a separate and 
unequal regional transit system.157  The decline in local bus service 
                                                                                                                 
 150. N.Y. Urban League, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1040. 
 151. Id. at 1038 (plaintiffs had analyzed differences in farebox recovery ratios to 
show discrimination). 
 152. See Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 611 F. Supp. 994 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 153. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11135(a) (Deering 2017).  The Darensburg plaintiffs also 
asserted an intentional discrimination claim under Title VI, but that claim was 
dismissed on summary judgment. See Darensburg v. MTC, PUB. ADVOCS., 
http://www.publicadvocates.org/our-work/transportation-justice-issues/darensburg-v-
mtc [https://perma.cc/2U4N-7PDV]; Darensburg v. MTC, ACLU N. CAL. (Jan. 25, 
2010), https://www.aclunc.org/our-work/legal-docket/darensburg-v-mtc 
[https://perma.cc/47RA-VVHG]; Kate Baldridge, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie:  
California’s Section 11135 Fails to Provide Plaintiffs Relief in Darensburg v. 
Metropolitan Transportation Commission, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 7, 10-11 
(2013). 
 154. Baldridge, supra note 153, at 10. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See PUB. ADVOCS., supra note 153. 
 157. Golub et al., supra note 53, at 719-20. 
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caused harm to low-income communities of color, isolating them from 
opportunity on a large scale.158 
The metropolitan context of the case posed significant challenges 
to finding evidence of discrimination, however.  The nine-county Bay 
Area region under the MTC’s jurisdiction included approximately 
two dozen transit agencies, of which seven, among them AC Transit, 
BART, and Caltrain, accounted for ninety-five percent of the region’s 
transit ridership.159  In the aggregate, sixty-one percent of Bay Area 
transit riders were people of color; about two-thirds of bus riders 
were people of color, however, compared to just over half of rail 
riders.160  Disaggregating further among the seven large transit 
systems, three—which plaintiffs’ expert characterized as “high 
minority” systems—carried seventy percent or more people of color, 
whereas four others ranged from under forty percent to just over 
fifty-five percent.161 
Plaintiffs asserted that MTC’s system for funding buses and rail 
systems had discriminatory effects.162  Bus service relied primarily on 
operating subsidies,163 while rail service required large capital 
subsidies, both to maintain and expand services.  Ultimately, MTC 
found itself with operating shortfalls for its bus systems, which it 
failed to cover, while it used its discretionary funds to fully cover 
BART and Caltrain’s large capital shortfalls.164  Further, MTC’s 
multi-billion dollar program of transit capital expansion identified 
many expansion priorities for BART and Caltrain, but few for AC 
Transit.  The final program devoted ninety-four percent of seventeen 
billion dollars to rail expansion, but less than five percent to bus 
projects like bus rapid transit.165 
The trial court found that MTC’s actions indeed contributed to 
service reductions at AC Transit, but it dismissed the plaintiff class’ 
case regarding disparate funding instruments, finding they had not 
                                                                                                                 
 158. The trial court noted “the predicament of the members of the Plaintiff Class, 
who have experienced declines in bus services on which they depend to meet their 
basic needs, such as getting to school and work safely and on time.” Darensburg, 611 
F. Supp. 2d at 1060. 
 159. Id. at 997-98. 
 160. Id. at 1047. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. AC Transit’s reliance on operating subsidy was due in part to the fact that the 
low income of its riders limited the fares it could charge.  In addition, capital 
purchases were a relatively small proportion of the costs of operating bus service. 
 164. Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
 165. Id. at 1013, 1043. 
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met their prima facie burden.166  And while the trial court found the 
plaintiffs had made a prima facie case with respect to MTC’s transit 
capital funding program, MTC was able to rebut these allegations.167  
Plaintiffs showed that MTC favored rail projects, assuming 
automatically that they would mitigate congestion, while bus projects 
proposed by AC Transit were required to prove congestion-reducing 
impacts.168  Similarly, they showed that MTC did not apply a rigorous 
cost-effectiveness measure to the projects it funded, further 
disfavoring bus proposals.169  Nonetheless, the court found plaintiffs’ 
showing to be “non-robust” and reduced MTC’s burden for rebutting 
the claim, requiring just a “legitimate justification” for its allocation 
of funds, so as not to second guess the MTC’s “policy decisions.”170  
The court concluded that, because MTC had convened a Partnership 
Board of local transportation and transit agencies working to reach a 
consensus, even if it was less than unanimous, it was a sufficiently 
legitimate justification.171  The court decided this even though the 
Board had no accountability to residents in general—and residents of 
color in particular—and despite testimony that consensus by such 
boards is “often heavily coerced.”172 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. at 1043-44.  Plaintiffs compared operators of “high minority” and “low 
minority” operators (supported by MTC’s use of a seventy percent benchmark for 
Title VI monitoring purposes) and found significant disparities, while MTC’s 
statistical experts analyzed the operators on a continuum and did not find a statistical 
correlation between MTC funding and level of minority ridership. 
 167. Id. at 1060.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of 
MTC, while rejecting the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs proved a prima facie 
case. See generally Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 636 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
 168. Darensburg, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1014. 
 169. Id. at 1043. 
 170. Id. at 1054 (“[A]n overly strict requirement of establishing transportation 
necessity in the sense of indispensability is not appropriate for judging the complex 
policy decisions and tradeoffs that MTC must make in allocating funds that are 
always too scarce among competing legitimate needs to achieve the myriad goals for 
the region mandated by the planning statute.”). 
 171. Id. at 1055. 
 172. Id.  The court went on to reject plaintiffs’ argument that “MTC could score 
and rank bus and rail projects together . . . based on how well they perform against 
criteria that have a relationship to improved air quality, cost effectiveness and other 
regional and statutory objectives.” Id. at 1060.  In the court’s view, “Plaintiffs 
presented no evidence as to whether this alternative would be equally effective in 
using [transit capital expansion] funds while lessening any racial disparity.”  Also, the 
“Court recognizes that [transit] operators do not always feel at complete liberty to 
risk giving offense to MTC.” Id. at 1055. 
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B. Environmental Justice 
The EJ Executive Order, issued by President Bill Clinton in 1994, 
requires federal executive agencies and entities receiving federal 
funds to “identify[] and address[], as appropriate, disproportionately 
high and adverse human health or environmental effects of [their] 
programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-
income populations . . . .”173  The Order also prohibits the exclusion 
of persons (or populations) from participating in, reaping the benefits 
of, or being discriminated against under such programs, policies, and 
activities, because of their race, color, or national origin.174 
It is notable that this prohibition explicitly applies to “populations” 
in addition to individuals.  By using the word “populations” rather 
than “communities,” the Order extends not only to the residents of 
specific geography but also to “populations” who are similarly-
situated with respect to the benefits or burdens of a plan or project, 
but may live far apart.175  This is especially relevant to transportation, 
as users of a particular portion of the transportation network, such as 
buses, and who are “similarly affected” by a plan or policy, may 
comprise a protected population.  The EJ Executive Order overlaps 
with, but is distinct from, Title VI.  The EJ Executive Order extends 
its protections to “low-income populations” not otherwise protected 
under federal civil rights law. 176 
Under the DOT’s official policy, all DOT operating 
administrations must fully consider and incorporate environmental 
justice principles.177  The FHWA and FTA are among these DOT 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
 174. Id. 
 175. “Minority Population” is defined as “any readily identifiable groups of 
minority persons who live in geographic proximity, and if circumstances warrant, 
geographically dispersed/transient persons (such as migrant workers or Native 
Americans) who will be similarly affected by a proposed DOT program, policy or 
activity.” UPDATED DOT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 5610.2(A), supra note 94, 
at app. § 1(e).  For a similar definition of “low-income population,” see id. at app. 
§ 1(d). 
 176. Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629.  Additional differences are noted 
in the  DOT’s Updated Environmental Justice Order:  “engaging in environmental 
justice analysis under Federal transportation planning and NEPA provisions will not 
necessarily satisfy Title VI requirements.  Similarly, a Title VI analysis would not 
necessarily satisfy environmental justice requirements, since Title VI does not include 
low-income populations.  Moreover, Title VI applies to all Federally-funded projects 
and activities, not solely those which may have adverse human health or 
environmental effects on communities.” UPDATED DOT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
ORDER 5610.2(A), supra note 94. 
 177. See UPDATED DOT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 5610.2(A), supra note 
94, at intro. 
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operating administrations; they are also charged with overseeing 
MPO compliance with Title VI in the regional planning process.  The 
FHWA defines environmental justice as “identifying and addressing 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects, including the interrelated social and economic effects of their 
programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-
income populations in the United States” to achieve an equitable 
distribution of benefits and burdens.178  The FTA identifies three 
guiding principles for agencies incorporating environmental justice 
into their mission:  (1) avoid disproportionately high and adverse 
effects; (2) ensure the full and fair participation by all potentially 
affected communities; and (3) prevent the denial of, reduction in, or 
significant delay in the receipt of benefits by minority and low-income 
populations.179 
FTA’s prohibition of delay originated in the DOT Order on 
Environmental Justice.180  Long-range planning already requires 
explicit analysis of timing.  Federal law mandates modeling plan 
investments in “year of expenditure dollars,”181 meaning that 
assumptions must be made about the timing of investments.  
However, those assumptions are rarely made transparent and so it is 
unclear how common these delays are.  At least one instance of delay 
in the provision of benefits to underserved populations has been 
documented.182 
C. The Fair Housing Act:  Affirmative Obligations and Judicial 
Enforcement 
The Fair Housing Act, enacted in 1968 as Title VIII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, requires all executive departments and federal 
agencies to administer their “programs and activities relating to 
housing and urban development” in furtherance of the civil rights 
goals codified in the Fair Housing Act and to cooperate with the 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ORDER 6640.23A, 
FHWA ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN MINORITY POPULATIONS 
AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS (2012) [hereinafter FHWA ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE ORDER 6640.23A]. 
 179. FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., CIRCULAR 4703.1, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE POLICY 
GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION RECIPIENTS, at ch. I, § A (2012) 
[hereinafter FTA CIRCULAR 4703.1]. 
 180. UPDATED DOT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 5610.2(A), supra note 94, at 
app. § 1(f). 
 181. See 23 C.F.R. § 450.324(f)(11)(iv) (2017). 
 182. See Petition for Writ of Mandate in Intervention, Cleveland Nat’l Forest 
Found. v. San Diego Ass’n of Gov’ts Bd. of Dirs., No. 37-2011-00101593-CU-TT-CTL 
(Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2012). 
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Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (“HUD”) to achieve those ends.183  The Act’s 
obligation to “affirmatively further” fair housing is particularly 
important to solving metropolitan segregation, exclusion, and 
inequality.184  While this requirement applies to the DOT, the DOT 
has not yet taken steps to implement it. 
The Fair Housing Act requires agencies to affirmatively replace 
segregation with “truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”185  
The affirmative elements of the Act remained dormant for decades 
due to a political context beset by antagonistic race relations and 
hostility toward affirmative action programs.186  Until recently, HUD 
ignored requirements to affirmatively promote integration and 
ameliorate the legacies of discrimination.187 
HUD recipients are expected to conduct an “Analysis of 
Impediments to Fair Housing Choice” and self-certify compliance 
with the obligation to affirmatively further fair housing.  For many 
years, that obligation was specified only in general terms in a HUD 
Planning Guide.188  However, a 2009 case brought under the False 
Claims Act (described in greater detail later in this Section) exposed 
                                                                                                                 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (“All executive departments and agencies shall administer 
their programs and activities relating to housing and urban development (including 
any Federal agency having regulatory or supervisory authority over financial 
institutions) in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of this title and shall 
cooperate with the Secretary to further such purposes.”). 
 184. Id. § 3608(e) (“The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
shall . . . administer the programs and activities relating to housing and urban 
development in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of this 
subchapter . . . .”). 
 185. Id. §§ 3608(d)-(e); Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to 
Integrated Housing:  A Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s 
“Affirmatively Further” Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 125 (2012). 
 186. See BILES, supra note 48, at 180-87 (President Nixon ordered Secretary of 
Housing George Romney to cease his efforts to use his authority under Title VI to 
desegregate and improve housing affordability in suburbs, eventually forcing him out 
of the cabinet); Nikole Hannah-Jones, Living Apart:  How the Government Betrayed 
a Landmark Civil Rights Law, PROPUBLICA (June 25, 2015, 1:26 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/living-apart-how-the-government-betrayed-a-
landmark-civil-rights-law [https://perma.cc/T4CY-EKG9]. 
 187. In 1993, HUD promulgated a sub-regulatory handbook on AFFH. U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE (1993) [hereinafter FAIR 
HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE], https://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AF2L-TT8K].  While far less rigorous and detailed than the 2015 
rule, it was relied upon by courts in support of some basic propositions. See, e.g., Cty. 
of Westchester v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 802 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 188. See generally FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 187. 
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the need for clearer guidance.189  As a result, in July 2015, nearly fifty 
years after the adoption of the statutory requirement, HUD adopted 
a comprehensive new rule on affirmatively furthering fair housing 
applicable specifically to state and local jurisdictions that receive 
HUD funds and to public housing authorities.190  The rule explicitly 
promotes the use of “regional approaches to address fair housing 
issues,” recognizing the cross-jurisdictional character of segregation 
and disparity,191 and requires “meaningful action” to address 
disparities in housing needs, segregated living patterns, and change 
racially and ethnically concentrated areas of poverty into areas of 
opportunity.192  The final rule identifies six specific goals of assessing 
fair housing that provide procedural requirements for efficient and 
complete data collection, evaluation of integrated solutions with 
defined goals, metrics, and milestones, and ways to measure progress 
upon implementation of HUD programs.193 
HUD grantees are also required to consider neighborhood-level 
transportation and transit access, educational and economic 
opportunity, and environmental health factors when evaluating 
programs.194  This creates clear guidelines for MPOs that receive 
funds from HUD, but other MPOs will not be held to the same 
standards.195 
                                                                                                                 
 189. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y. v. Westchester 
Cty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 190. Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015) (to 
be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, et al.). 
 191. Id. at 42,273; see also id. at 42,286 (describing the importance of a regional 
analysis of fair housing issues and solutions). 
 192. 24 C.F.R § 5.152 (2015).  Other protected categories include disability and 
familial status. 
 193. Id. § 5.154(d).  Specifically, the “assessment of fair housing” (“AFH”) must:  
(1) identify, with robust community engagement, current patterns and conditions of 
segregation, racially concentrated poverty, disparities in access to opportunity, and 
disproportionate housing needs, utilizing data HUD provides and other relevant 
regional data; (2) identify key contributing factors of the patterns and conditions 
identified; (3) prioritize the most significant contributing factors and set goals that 
will meaningfully address the high priority factors, with “metrics and milestones” for 
each goal; (4) tailor near-term actions and investments consistent with those goals; 
and (5) measure progress over the near term. See id. 
 194. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., ASSESSMENT OF FAIR HOUSING TOOL 3-4 
(2015), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Assessment-of-Fair-
Housing-Tool.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XMT-FYKP]. 
 195. See Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994); see also EOo, 
Comment to Role of MPOs in the Coordination and Administration of HUD 
Programs, HUDUSER.GOV (Nov. 5, 2015, 3:05 PM), http://www.huduser.gov/
forums/node/361 [https://perma.cc/2NAQ-BUKW].  The DOT has not implemented 
the AFFH obligation in the Fair Housing Act, and MPOs (unless they are HUD 
grantees) are not directly subject to HUD’s AFFH rule. See supra notes 183-84 and 
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While the DOT has not yet adopted its own AFFH rule, in 2016 
the Transportation Secretary joined the Secretaries of HUD and the 
U.S. Department of Education in authoring a “dear colleague” letter 
to transportation agencies nationally, to “identify impediments to 
accessing opportunity,” integrate the principles of AFFH into their 
decision-making, and coordinate with local jurisdictions on efforts to 
address segregation.196  The letter recognizes that housing, 
transportation, and education must be dealt with together to ensure 
improved equity of opportunity, sustainable economic growth, and 
environmental responsibilities.197  It encourages collaboration 
between MPOs and other transportation, housing, and education 
agencies “to align public transportation routes, sidewalk construction, 
and related bus stops with schools and housing facilities,” to 
“[e]nhance bicycle and pedestrian safety in and around local schools,” 
and to “[i]nclude local school districts, housing authorities, Head Start 
programs, community colleges, and other related entities in 
developing coordinated mass transit plans” like the RTP.198  It 
continues: 
HUD strongly encourages regional coordination in preparing an 
Assessment of Fair Housing . . . . [as] many of the issues at stake are 
not confined to any one local jurisdiction’s borders, nor are the tools 
to address those issues always within the power of a single agency 
acting alone.199 
Lawsuits challenging regional inequality based on the provisions of 
the Fair Housing Act, which includes an explicit private right of 
action, have generally fared much better than those brought under 
Title VI.  As an example, in Hills v. Gautreaux, a case brought against 
the Secretary of HUD (Hills), the Supreme Court set an important 
precedent for fair housing enforcement extending beyond city 
limits.200  At issue were public housing policies that systematically 
concentrated poverty in the predominantly African American 
                                                                                                                 
accompanying text.  This is true, despite that fact that the focus of the rule on 
overcoming patterns of segregation is already part of the direct Title VI and EJ 
Executive Order obligations of MPOs. See 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(1) (2017); UPDATED 
DOT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 5610.2(A), supra note 94, at app. § 1(f). 
 196. Letter from Julian Castro, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., John B. 
King, Jr., Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Educ., & Anthony R. Foxx, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., to Colleagues (June 3, 2016) [hereinafter Tri-Agency letter], 
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/06032016-dear-colleagues-letter.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5SMJ-4MFV]. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. (emphasis added). 
 200. See 425 U.S. 284 (1976). 
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neighborhoods of Chicago.201  The Court held that the policies 
violated the Fifth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 
ordered HUD to end its discriminatory policies and adopt programs 
that dispersed subsidized housing.202  The Court noted that HUD had 
erred by limiting housing options for minority groups to housing 
within city limits.203  Professor David Troutt, the founding director of 
the Rutgers Center on Law in Metropolitan Equity, observed that 
“Gautreaux stands for the proposition that the benefit of fair housing 
entails mobility to areas of (suburban) high opportunity.”204 
Even relying on the AFFH provisions of Section 808, which unlike 
the rest of the Fair Housing Act does not include an explicit private 
right of action, plaintiffs have had substantial success in court.  In 
Thompson v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
for example, a Maryland district judge found that federal regulators 
had failed to further the Act’s policies by not considering a regional 
approach to desegregation of public housing under the FHA’s 
requirement.205  Highlighting regional solutions, the judge concluded 
that “[g]eographic considerations, economic limitations, population 
shifts, etc. have rendered it impossible to effect a meaningful degree 
of desegregation of public housing by redistributing the public 
housing population of Baltimore City within the City limits.”206   
HUD’s authority to enforce AFFH requirements in a rigorous and 
meaningful manner was addressed most forcefully in County of 
Westchester v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development.207  The Anti-Discrimination Center of Metropolitan 
New York brought an action under the False Claims Act against 
Westchester County asserting that the county had falsely certified its 
compliance with fair housing requirements, thereby accepting HUD 
funding to which it was not entitled.208  Westchester argued that the 
Fair Housing Act did not obligate it to identify racial discrimination 
and segregation as impediments to “fair housing.”209  The Court 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Id. at 285. 
 202. Id. at 284-85. 
 203. Id. at 286. 
 204. David D. Troutt, Inclusion Imagined:  Fair Housing as Metropolitan Equity, 
65 BUFFALO L. REV. 5, 39 (2017). 
 205. 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 524 (D. Md. 2005) (affirming HUD’s rejection of the 
County’s analysis that it would affirmatively further fair housing). 
 206. Id. at 408. 
 207. 802 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 208. Id. at 418. 
 209. United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. 
Westchester Cty., 495 F. Supp. 2d 375, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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disagreed, ruling that a grantee of federal funds must consider 
impediments erected by race discrimination, and if such impediments 
exist, take appropriate action to overcome its effects.210  The Second 
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s opinion upon appeal, affirming 
HUD’s authority to enforce AFFH based on criteria that considered, 
among other things, the exclusionary effect of local zoning 
ordinances, and to deny funding on that basis.211 
D. The Role of Federal Administrative Enforcement 
Administrative enforcement of MPOs’ equity analyses is an 
important tool for advocates who hope to push agencies to address 
regional equity concerns.  While there are only a few cases of 
administrative complaints dealing with equity analyses,212 there are 
reasons why administrative complaints can provide an important 
avenue to addressing regional equity. 
One notable administrative complaint involved a rail extension 
called the Oakland Airport Connector (“OAC”), a decades-old 
dream of regional planners to connect the BART system to the 
Oakland airport.213  Original designs, approved by voters nine years 
earlier as part of a regional tax measure, included stops along the job-
rich and heavily minority Hegenberger corridor.214  However, budget 
cuts removed the intermediate stops, drastically reducing the benefits 
for the local community, while preserving all of the burdens of the 
new tracks which sat above ground on pilings, creating an eyesore and 
blocking views.215  Furthermore, the complaint contended that the 
twelve-dollar round-trip price (double the cost of the existing airport 
shuttle) would make it unaffordable for the local community and for 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Id. at 387. 
 211. Cty. of Westchester, 802 F.3d at 422. 
 212. A Title VI complaint against the City of Beavercreek (Dayton, OH) involved 
administrative enforcement (though not equity analysis).  Complainants alleged civil 
rights infringement arising from the failure to allow bus stops near a shopping center 
in suburban Beavercreek.  Bus stops would serve urban Dayton RTA passengers, 
who are disproportionately minority and low income.  FHWA investigated and found 
the complaint to have merit and ordered Beavercreek to allow the stops. See Letter 
from Ellis Jacobs, Att’y, Advocs. for Basic Legal Equal., Inc., to Title VI Program 
Coordinator, Off. of Civ. Rts., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. (Aug. 10, 2011), 
http://www.lawolaw.org/images/stories/INTERNET/GET_INFO/beavercreek-lead-
dot-complaint081111.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TPV-9MLV]. 
 213. See Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Exec. 
Order 12898, Urban Habitat Program v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 
http://www.publicadvocates.org/wp-content/uploads/fta_titlevi_complaint_09109
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CHZ-WTR4]. 
 214. Id. at 3. 
 215. Id. at 6. 
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the airport workers who stood to benefit from the project.216  In 
September 2009, Public Advocates filed a successful civil rights and 
environmental justice administrative complaint with the FTA on 
behalf of partners Urban Habitat, Genesis, and TransForm.217 
The complaint alleged that in BART’s rush to build the OAC, the 
agency did not produce a proper equity analysis for the project.  
BART instead relied on outdated project evaluations in unrelated 
Title VI analyses, which did not include this project.218  The original 
project evaluated assumed a capital cost of around forty percent of 
the final projected cost, and a round-trip fare of only two dollars.219  
The complaint also contended that an investment in high-
performance bus service was not fairly considered, and thus the 
environmental impact statement was without merit.220 
The outdated project evaluation concluded that environmental 
justice communities near the project would not suffer any burdens 
from development induced by the investment.221  However, FTA 
Circular 4702.1A requires an analysis of both the burdens and the 
benefits, and it was fairly clear that environmental justice 
communities would not reap any benefits from the investment.222 
The FTA investigated the administrative complaint, and found it 
meritorious.  It also determined that BART was out of compliance 
with a number of other Title VI and EJ requirements articulated in 
the FTA Title VI Circular, and required it to adopt and implement a 
comprehensive Corrective Action Plan.223  A year earlier, MTC, the 
MPO serving the nine-county San Francisco bay area,224 had allocated 
seventy million dollars in funding under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”) to the OAC project.225  Because of a 
                                                                                                                 
 216. Id. at 9. 
 217. Id. at 24. 
 218. Id. at 1. 
 219. Id. at 7. 
 220. Id. at 1. 
 221. Id. at 13. 
 222. Id. at 13. 
 223. See FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT 
DISTRICT TITLE VI CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN, ACTION PLAN ITEM 5.1 (2010), 
https://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/docs/Temp_Rollback_TitleVI_ExecSum.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L5Z5-H9Z7]. 
 224. See About MTC, METRO. TRANSP. COMM’N, http://mtc.ca.gov/about 
[https://perma.cc/Z8GF-6W9L]. 
 225. Letter from Peter Rogoff, Adm’r, Fed. Transit Admin., to Steve Heminger, 
Exec. Dir., Metro. Trans. Comm’n, and Dorothy Dugger, Gen. Manager, S.F. Bay 
Area Rapid Transit Dist. (Feb. 12, 2010), http://mtcwatch.com/pdfiles/2-10_FTA_
MTC.html [https://perma.cc/2LCX-E72Z]. 
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looming ARRA deadline, and BART’s inability to ensure compliance 
in time to meet that deadline, the FTA required MTC to reallocate 
those funds, which went instead to maintain existing transit service by 
bus and rail operators throughout the region.226  The decision was the 
first time a Title VI complaint resulted in the withdrawal of federal 
stimulus funds.227  While the case involved a smaller geography than 
region-wide plans or investments, the fate of OAC had region-wide 
implications because it was part of the regional transit expansion 
program at the heart of the then ongoing Darensburg complaint 
against MTC and was typical of high-priced rail expansion projects 
favored over lower cost bus investments.228 
In 2003, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (“USCCR”) studied 
EJ Executive Order and Title VI enforcement by HUD, DOT, and 
other federal agencies, and found that they fell short of fulfilling basic 
directives.229  The Obama Administration initiated a process to 
coordinate and invigorate environmental justice enforcement 
throughout the federal government, which included a commitment by 
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Civil Rights Division to provide 
legal and technical assistance and to litigate “when informal 
resolution or fund termination are not viable solutions.”230  There is 
good reason to believe the Trump Administration will roll back this 
process.  With the important role that administrative enforcement 
now plays in addressing metropolitan inequality, many of the recent 
gains will likely stall. 
IV.  THE MPO EQUITY ANALYSIS IN PROMISE AND PRACTICE 
MPOs are subject to federal requirements to conduct analyses of 
the impacts of their plans on populations and communities protected 
by both Title VI and the EJ Executive Order and to take affirmative 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id.  Public Advocates also filed a second administrative complaint with FTA 
in June 2010, this time against MTC.  Plaintiffs asserted that MTC had failed to 
ensure that BART, its subrecipient of federal funds, was in compliance with Title VI, 
and also that MTC was in violation of its obligation to certify that the metropolitan 
planning process complied with Title VI. See Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and Exec. Order 12898, supra note 213. 
 228. See text accompanying supra notes 152-58. 
 229. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., NOT IN MY BACKYARD:  EXECUTIVE ORDER 
12,898 AND TITLE VI AS TOOLS FOR ACHIEVING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2003), 
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/envjust/ej0104.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE8M-YQRH]. 
 230. See Daria E. Neal, Recent Developments in Federal Implementation of 
Executive Order 12,898 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 57 HOW. L.J. 
941, 942 (2014). 
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steps to address inequities.231  In principle, the Title VI analysis of the 
plan will serve to support the required Title VI certification.232  DOT 
requires a separate Environmental Justice analysis to “identify and 
address” disproportionate adverse impacts on low-income and 
minority populations.  Despite some differences, the Title IV 
Environmental Justice analyses of the LRTP share the same 
fundamental purpose:  “to assess the benefit and impact distributions 
of the investments included in the plan,”233 in order to ensure that 
racial and ethnic minorities (Title VI) and low-income and minority 
populations (Environmental Justice Order) receive an equitable 
distribution of benefits without bearing an unfair share of burdens.234  
Due to the range of impacts of the LRTP, planning processes must be 
meaningful and deliberate.  Explicit categories of analysis are 
important, as is identification of concrete goals.  Current regulatory 
requirements help promote this kind of analysis, but they should go 
further.  This Part focuses on the six functions of an equity analysis 
and how they are implemented in practice. 
A. Equity Analysis in Promise 
As planners and advocates work to ensure the enforcement of 
MPO equity requirements, it is critical to set out what a robust equity 
                                                                                                                 
 231. See, e.g., UPDATED DOT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 5610.2(A), supra 
note 94, at § 7(a) (“[E]ngaging in environmental justice analysis under Federal 
transportation planning and NEPA provisions will not necessarily satisfy Title VI 
requirements.  Similarly, a Title VI analysis would not necessarily satisfy 
environmental justice requirements, since Title VI does not include low-income 
populations.  Moreover, Title VI applies to all Federally-funded projects and 
activities, not solely those which may have adverse human health or environmental 
effects on communities.”) (emphasis added); Memorandum from Kenneth R. Wykle, 
Adm’r, Fed. Highway Admin., and Gordon J. Linton, Adm’r, Fed. Transit Admin., to 
the FHWA Div. Adm’rs and FTA Reg’l Adm’rs (Oct. 7, 1999) [hereinafter FHWA & 
FTA Memorandum], https://cms.fta.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/docs/Implementing
_TitleVI_Requirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8BC-7TVK] (requiring “an 
“analytical process . . . to assess the benefit and impact distributions of the 
investments included in the plan”) (emphasis added); FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra 
note 84, at ch. V, § 2(d)-(e) (requiring MPOs to “analyze the impacts of the 
distribution of State and Federal funds in the aggregate for public transportation 
purposes” on “minority and non-minority populations” in order to identify “any 
disparate impacts on the basis of race, color, or national origin”). 
 232. As noted above, each MPO is required to “certify . . . that the metropolitan 
transportation planning process is being carried out in accordance with . . . Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” 23 C.F.R. § 450.334(a)(3); see also FTA CIRCULAR 
4702.1B, supra note 84, at ch. VI, § 3. 
 233. See, e.g., FHWA & FTA Memorandum, supra note 231. 
 234. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REFERENCE GUIDE 1 
(2015) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REFERENCE GUIDE]; FTA CIRCULAR 
4703.1, supra note 179, at ch. I. 
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analysis would look like if the spirit of the federal requirements was 
upheld.  Such an approach would serve the following functions:  (1) 
prophylactically prevent unfair decisions from being made or carried 
out; (2) support active reversals of discrimination; (3) facilitate 
administrative enforcement; (4) improve civic engagement; (5) 
improve plan outcomes; and (6) aid local jurisdictions in complying 
with AFFH. 
1. Prophylactic Function 
Preventing unfair decisions at the front end of metropolitan 
planning is critically important, not only because legal remedies at the 
back end are not guaranteed, but also due to the practical difficulty of 
reversing the durable impacts of transportation investments, many of 
which physically alter the built environment.  Further, the mere 
adoption of a long-range plan, before any of its projects are built, 
sends signals to private developers and land speculators about 
intended infrastructure that can contribute to harmful impacts in the 
near term.  For instance, in 2013 MTC adopted PBA, a long-range 
plan.  By signaling that the transportation investment would focus on 
“priority development areas” near transit, areas that overlapped 
extensively with historical low-income communities of color that the 
agency identified as “Communities of Concern,”235 the agency 
acknowledged, albeit indirectly, that the investment would contribute 
to increased risk of displacement.236  Because of the almost 
immediate consequences of announcing a plan, adequate equity 
analysis must occur at the earliest possible stage, when alternatives 
are being developed and assessed. 
                                                                                                                 
 235. METRO. TRANSP. COMM’N & ASS’N OF BAY AREA GOV’TS, DRAFT PLAN BAY 
AREA:  DRAFT EQUITY ANALYSIS REPORT 4-18 (2013), http://www.planbayarea.org/
sites/default/files/pdf/Draft_Plan_Bay_Area/Draft_Equity_Analysis_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CL57-MDUV]. 
 236. See Memorandum from Steve Heminger, Exec. Dir., Metro. Transp. Comm’n, 
to MTC Plan. Comm. and the Ass’n of Bay Area Gov’ts Admin. Comm. (Oct. 7, 
2016) (on file with authors).  Under the heading “Why are Communities of Concern 
performing better on select performance targets?” MTC’s executive director noted:  
With regards to displacement risk, the Draft Preferred Scenario did not 
concentrate growth as significantly in highly-populated Communities of 
Concern—such as those in East Oakland and East San Jose—as extensively 
as other scenarios like Big Cities.  This reduced the risk of gentrification of 
those locations and resulted in much lower displacement risk as compared 
to areas outside Communities of Concern. 
See id. 
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2. Support Creation of an Action Plan 
In addition to avoiding discriminatory programs, plans must also 
actively invest in programs to reverse inequities.  The EJ Executive 
Order, with its “identify and address” language recognizes the 
connection between the analysis and the crafting of an action plan.237  
As does the HUD rule on affirmatively furthering fair housing, which 
requires “[s]trategies and actions [which] must affirmatively further 
fair housing,”238 and thereby makes that connection even more 
explicitly. 
3. Facilitate Administrative Enforcement 
MPO planning should also facilitate administrative enforcement.  
Sadly, where administrative enforcement has been most likely to 
succeed has been in cases in which the local agency altogether failed 
to comply with a clearly-articulated requirement, as was the case in 
BART’s OAC project, discussed above in Section III.D.239  Because 
“anything goes” in terms of equity analyses, a complainant needs to 
show complete disregard for the process to find remedy. 
A more uniform and rigorous planning and equity analysis process, 
however, would allow local stakeholders to enforce standards more 
easily by illustrating clearly (a) whether the MPO appropriately 
identified the most significant contributors to inequality in its region 
(including those of greatest concern to the low-income and minority 
communities whose concerns are required to be sought out and 
considered in the planning process) and (b) whether the MPO had 
committed to actions appropriately tailored to overcoming or 
significantly reducing those contributors.  Since state departments of 
transportation are responsible for monitoring the Title VI compliance 
of MPOs, clear guidance that serves this function would also improve 
oversight at the state level. 240 
4. Improve Civic Engagement 
As previously mentioned, federal law explicitly requires MPO 
public participation plans to “describe explicit procedures, strategies, 
                                                                                                                 
 237. See UPDATED DOT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 5610.2(A), supra note 
94, at § 7(b) (emphasis added). 
 238. 24 C.F.R. § 5.154(d)(5).  This was already required by former HUD 
regulation, 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a)(1). 
 239. See text accompanying supra notes 213-20.  One counter-example is FHWA’s 
enforcement action against the city of Beavercreek, Ohio, based on its discriminatory 
refusal to allow the siting of bus stops on its streets. See Letter from Ellis Jacobs, 
supra note 212. 
 240. See generally FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra note 84. 
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and desired outcomes” for “[s]eeking out and considering the needs 
of those traditionally underserved by existing transportation 
systems.”241  MPOs must also describe the steps taken to identify and 
consider the mobility needs of minority populations.242 
Civic engagement is critical to address the historic and ongoing 
exclusion of the voices of residents of low-income communities and 
communities of color.243  Whereas transportation planning practice 
has historically emphasized automobile congestion mitigation, the 
concerns of communities of color require analyses, which may differ 
from those typically undertaken.244  Public engagement, in itself, can 
improve feelings of trust and a shared commitment to plan 
implementation.  MTC’s analysis of displacement risk during Plan 
Bay Area, a result of the Six Wins engagement, demonstrated the 
superior performance of the EEJ scenario on that outcome and 
substantial shortcomings in the agency’s preferred plan.  As an added 
benefit, high-quality equity analyses can also engage the broader 
region in discussions about ongoing inequity and its consequences.245 
5. Improve Plan Outcomes 
Observers of urban and regional planning have long asserted that 
more inclusive planning processes incorporating the views and 
experiences of a diverse public make for better outcomes.246  Again, 
                                                                                                                 
 241. 23 C.F.R. § 450.316(a)(1)(vii). 
 242. FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra note 84, at ch. VI, § 2. 
 243. See generally Rothstein, supra note 3 (describing white domination of 
residential zoning policies that excluded minorities). 
 244. Susan Handy, Regional Transportation Planning in the US:  An Examination 
of Changes in Technical Aspects of the Planning Process in Response to Changing 
Goals, 15 TRANSPORT POL’Y 113, 113-15 (2008) (describing the historical emphasis of 
transportation planning on automobile performance).  Among such concerns are 
environmental health, spatial mismatch, displacement risk, public transit accessibility, 
physical access for disabled persons, and combined housing and transportation cost 
burdens. See, e.g., ALEX KARNER ET AL., WE CAN GET THERE FROM HERE:  NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSPORTATION EQUITY 18-24 (Nat’l Ctr. for Sustainable Transp. 
ed., 2016); Karen Lucas & Peter Jones, Social Impacts and Equity Issues in 
Transport:  An Introduction, 21 J. TRANSPORT GEOGRAPHY 1, 1-3 (2012). 
 245. For example, the EEJ scenario (described in supra Section II.D) embodied a 
land use plan that increased the amount of affordable housing in high opportunity 
suburban areas.  This allowed low- and middle-income commuters to live closer to 
their jobs, reducing environmental impacts and overall congestion.  These results, 
demonstrating that the entire region prospers when equity is a guiding planning 
principle, can build support for unfamiliar equity-promoting policies. 
 246. Innes and Booher cite the potential for improved decisions as a result of the 
incorporation of “local knowledge” as one important purpose of public participation 
in planning. See Judith E. Innes & David E. Booher, Reframing Public Participation:  
Strategies for the 21st Century, 5 PLAN. THEORY & PRAC. 419, 422 (2004).  Nicholas 
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the experience of the EEJ in the Bay Area makes the point:  
developed by community groups across the region, the scenario 
outperformed the official plan not only in better meeting the needs of 
underserved community residents, but on a host of other measures, 
including reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and local street and 
road repaving.247 
Improved plan outcomes include environmental health and 
sustainability because underserved residents’ greater dependence on 
public transit and affordable housing near entry-level jobs makes 
them a natural constituency for climate-friendly policies and 
investments.  Those solutions also promote economic growth and 
sustainable growth across metropolitan regions, which prosper in 
proportion to their reduction of regional inequality.  Studies on 
regional equity conducted over decades have demonstrated the 
superior economic and health outcomes that can accrue when regions 
pursue equity-promoting policies.  Such benefits are driven by 
increased social capital, access to a more diverse labor pool, reduced 
political polarization, knowledge-sharing, and a sense of shared 
prosperity, among other drivers.248 
6. Aid Local Jurisdictions in Complying with Their AFFH 
Obligations 
Finally, through robust equity analyses MPOs can achieve the 
regional coordination now strongly encouraged by HUD under its 
2015 rule on AFFH and jointly supported by the Secretaries of HUD, 
DOT, and the Department of Education.  The MPO, a regional entity 
whose plans affect transportation, housing, and education, is best 
situated to promote more comprehensive standards to its equity 
analysis, in spite of gaps in regulatory guidance from the DOT. 
B. Equity Analyses:  Federal Guidance 
This Section focuses on guidance that the DOT has, and has not, 
provided to MPOs (in the absence of implementing the AFFH 
                                                                                                                 
Freudenberg theorized that enhanced participation and community capacity 
(including qualitative factors such as leadership, cohesion, and sense of community, 
among others) can result in more equitable environmental health outcomes. See 
Nicholas Freudenberg et al., Strengthening Community Capacity to Participate in 
Making Decisions to Reduce Disproportionate Environmental Exposures, 101 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH S123, S125-S129 (2011). 
 247. Marcantonio & Karner, supra note 97, at 12. 
 248. See, e.g., BENNER & PASTOR, supra note 18; CHRIS BENNER & MANUEL 
PASTOR, EQUITY, GROWTH, AND COMMUNITY:  WHAT THE NATION CAN LEARN 
FROM AMERICA’S METRO AREAS 10-12 (2015). 
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requirement of the Fair Housing Act) to support the development 
and implementation of the equity analyses described above in Section 
IV.A.  Various shortcomings reviewed here have contributed to the 
failure of MPOs across the country to conduct and follow through on 
robust equity analyses that function in the manner described in the 
previous Section.  The joint FHWA/FTA Memorandum on MPO 
Planning, while it incorporates requirements for a public participation 
plan and Title VI certification, is silent with respect to the 
requirement of MPOs to conduct and respond to an equity analysis of 
LRTPs or TIPs.  Thus, the most explicit bases for an equity analysis 
are sub-regulatory.249 
1. 1999 FHWA/FTA Title VI Memo 
To clarify how the requirements of Title VI and the EJ Executive 
Order apply to MPO planning, FHWA and FTA jointly issued the 
1999 Memorandum titled “Implementing Title VI Requirements in 
Metropolitan and Statewide Planning.”250  The Memorandum clarifies 
that Title VI and EJ Executive Order requirements apply to project 
evaluation as well as to plans and planning processes.251 
According to the Memorandum, MPOs must incorporate an 
analytical process to assess the benefit and impact distributions of the 
investments envisioned in a long-range transportation plan.252  This 
analytical process, more specifically, should be geared to assessing the 
regional benefits and burdens of transportation system investments 
for different socio-economic groups, and must be backed by a data 
collection process and analysis effort.253 
The memo also addresses the scope of FHWA and FTA’s main 
oversight role.  Though MPOs are left to self-certify compliance with 
Title VI, the two agencies retain the power to periodically review 
MPO self-certifications.254  FHWA and FTA conduct a certification 
review at the conclusion of each MPO planning cycle.  The agencies 
determine whether MPOs have, among other things, “[e]nsured that 
members of minority communities are provided with full 
opportunities to engage in the transportation planning process” and 
                                                                                                                 
 249. See, e.g., UPDATED DOT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 5610.2(A), supra 
note 94, at 8; FHWA ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 6640.23A, supra note 178; 
FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra note 84, at ch.VI; FHWA & FTA Memorandum, 
supra note 231. 
 250. FHWA & FTA Memorandum, supra note 231. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See, e.g., id. 
 254. See FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra note 84, at ch. VI. 
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“[m]onitored the activities of subrecipients with regard to Title VI 
compliance, where the MPO passes funds through to 
subrecipients.”255  FHWA and FTA also determine whether an 
MPO’s criteria for certification appear reasonable, are well 
documented, include responses to public comments, and address Title 
VI requirements.256 
While the language of the 1999 memo is strong in its explicit 
requirement to analytically assess the benefit and impact distributions 
of investments,257 it offers no specific guidance on how to conduct 
such an assessment, nor does it specify the importance of taking 
action to ensure an equitable distribution of benefits and burdens. 
2. FTA Title VI Circular 
In 2007, FTA issued a major revision of its Title VI guidance, in 
Circular 4702.1A.258  The Circular, consistent with the 1999 
Memorandum, requires that MPOs have an analytic basis for 
certifying their compliance with Title VI.259  In language that echoed 
the EJ Executive Order’s command to “identify and address,” it 
requires that such analytic basis “identif[y] the benefits and burdens 
of metropolitan transportation system investments for different 
socioeconomic groups” and “identif[y] imbalances and respon[d] to 
the analyses produced.”260 
Despite the clarity of the 2007 Circular in regards to MPO 
requirements, FTA omitted much of its stronger language when it 
reissued the Circular in 2012.261  While the 2012 Circular added new 
guidance for transit agencies regarding fare and service changes, it 
weakened the guidance relating to MPOs.  The Circular no longer 
                                                                                                                 
 255. Id. at ch. VI, § 3(c)-(d). 
 256. See Transportation Management Area Planning Certification Review Primer, 
TRANSP. PLAN. CAPACITY BUILDING, https://www.planning.dot.gov/documents/
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investments included in the plan”) (emphasis added). 
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circular was published in 1988. FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., CIRCULAR 4702.1, TITLE VI 
AND TITLE VI-DEPENDENT GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 
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 259. See FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1A, supra note 258. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra note 84, at ch. VI.  The amendment 
process followed in the wake of FTA’s groundbreaking administrative decision in the 
case of the BART Oakland Airport Connector. See supra Section III.D. 
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mentions the need for an “analytic basis” to support Title VI self-
certification.  It does, however, require an MPO “in its regional 
transportation planning capacity,” to “submit to the State 
[department of transportation] as the primary recipient, and also to 
FTA” a Title VI Program incorporating five required analyses:  (1) 
the general Title VI program requirements; (2) demographic profiling 
that identifies locations of minority populations in the aggregate; (3) 
minority access and mobility evaluations; (4) demographic mapping 
that overlays the percent minority and non-minority populations as 
identified by Census or American Community Survey data and charts 
analyzing impacts of state and federal funds; and (5) identification of 
disparate impacts on the basis of race, color, or national origin, any 
substantial legitimate justification for policies that result in such 
impacts, and possible alternatives having a less discriminatory 
impact.262 
The second requirement for demographic profiling is important as 
a supplement to the requirement in the MPO Planning Regulation 
that the public participation plan involve communities traditionally 
underserved by existing transportation systems, such as low-income 
and minority households.263  While the fourth and fifth analyses—
demographic mapping and disparate impacts, respectively—are weak 
substitutes for meaningful guidance on the conduct of a meaningful 
Title VI analysis, they at least have the virtue of tailoring the analysis 
to the disparate impact burden-shifting test of Inclusive 
Communities.264  The Circular’s disparate impact guidance stops short 
of requiring an assessment of alternatives more generally, nor does it 
even require the adoption of a less-discriminatory alternative.265 
State departments of transportation are responsible for monitoring 
Title VI compliance of the MPOs in their states.266  However, if the 
MPO passes planning funds through to one or more subrecipients, the 
MPO is responsible for ensuring those subrecipients comply with 
                                                                                                                 
 262. See FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra note 84, at ch. VI. 
 263. 23 C.F.R. § 450.316(a)(1)(vii) (2017). 
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Title VI.267  In its capacity as a primary recipient, the MPO must also 
describe to FTA how it assists subrecipients, including in their efforts 
to service minority populations.268  The Title VI Circular also 
incorporates requirements relating to facilitating involvement for 
residents with limited English proficiency).269 
Overall, the 2012 Circular represents a step backward from the 
greater clarity of both the 1999 Memorandum and the 2007 Circular.  
In particular, the elimination of language explicitly requiring MPOs 
to rest their Title VI self-certification on a valid “analytical basis” has 
condoned systemic abuse, including the complete failure to take race 
and ethnicity into account.270 
3. Agency Environmental Justice Orders 
The EJ Orders of the DOT and its operating administration, 
FHWA, incorporate much of the EJ Executive Order.271  Notably, 
FHWA’s order tracks the language of the EJ Executive Order closely.  
Yet, FHWA’s order fails to require the EJ Executive Order’s broader 
analysis of “equitable distribution of benefits and burdens.”  
Moreover, nothing in either Order directly addresses MPOs. 
Still, the similarities between the two are important.  The DOT 
defines “minority”272 and low-income.273  “Adverse effects” are 
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 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at ch. III, § 8 (“The content and considerations of Title VI, the Executive 
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the Department of Health and Human Services poverty guidelines.” Id. at app. 
§ 1(b). 
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defined as “the totality of significant individual or cumulative human 
health or environmental effects, including interrelated social and 
economic effects.”274  Included in that definition are “isolation, 
exclusion or separation of minority or low-income individuals within a 
given community or from the broader community,” as well as “the 
denial of, reduction in, or significant delay in the receipt of, 
benefits . . . .”275  It defines “[d]isproportionately high and adverse 
effect” as one that is:  “(l) is predominately borne by a minority 
population and/or a low-income population, or (2) will be suffered by 
the minority population and/or low-income population and is 
appreciably more severe or greater in magnitude than the adverse 
effect that will be suffered by the non-minority population and/or 
non-low-income population.”276 
C. Equity Analyses in Practice 
The lack of clear federal guidance has resulted in an increasing 
number of analyses that fail to meet the requirements of a robust 
equity analysis highlighted above in Section IV.A.277  This Section 
describes the approach that agencies typically undertake and its 
limitations. 
1. Emergence of a Consistent Approach 
MPOs tend to approach the analysis similarly, despite the relatively 
wide latitude they are afforded.  In part, the approach taken by an 
agency depends upon their available resources.  Larger agencies with 
well-developed travel demand models are likely to employ them in 
their analyses, while smaller agencies might rely on alternative 
methods ranging from the visual inspection of maps to blanket 
statements about the equitability of a particular plan or project.278  
The use of more quantitative or model-based methods does not 
necessarily produce an analysis that provides a clear picture of the 
equity impacts of a particular plan, however, and smaller agencies 
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have the potential to produce innovative analyses using census data, 
for example.279 
A three-step process for equity analysis has become popular among 
agencies with a travel demand model.  The process compares existing 
conditions or expected plan performance for “target” and reference 
populations.  It is thought that performance outcomes observed for 
the target population are representative of those actually or likely to 
be faced by that population.  The three steps are:  (1) identifying 
target populations or communities; (2) calculating performance 
measures (benefits and burdens); and (3) assessing equity by 
comparing measures between communities and reference 
populations.280 
First, to identify target populations or communities, agencies often 
use a “threshold” approach where geographic units, such as 
transportation analysis zones (“TAZ”) or census tracts, are 
categorized as the target population if they exceed a threshold 
concentration of the demographic group.281  For example, where the 
threshold is thirty percent, any TAZ with more than thirty percent 
low-income people would be a target community.  Other approaches 
exist that are neither quantitative nor spatial.282 
Second, performance measures typically reflect either the benefits 
or burdens of transportation projects and plans.283  The benefits of 
transportation investments have almost universally been defined to 
encompass accessibility, and burdens can include environmental costs 
like air and water pollution, as well as other amenity costs like noise 
and visual impacts.284 
In the third and final step, a final equity determination is made 
based on an assessment of the expected effect of a plan, project, or 
program on the target demographic groups.285  Such assessments can 
vary in the degree of their ambitions.286  A weak assessment might 
simply compare changes in outcomes for each demographic group of 
interest, for example measuring the percentage by which the benefits 
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and burdens change for each demographic group.  A stricter 
assessment might require that performance for the underserved 
population improve at a rate that exceeds that of the reference 
population. 
The three-step approach is implemented in a variety of ways 
because of the many variables and analytical judgment involved.  
Outcomes depend on the way communities are defined, the 
performance measures set, and the goals of the equity assessment. 
2. Continued Methodological Deficiencies 
These standard approaches have been subjected to wide-ranging 
critiques within the academic literature.287  A key question addressed 
in the literature is the extent to which the results of a given equity 
analysis actually reflect transportation conditions faced by 
disadvantaged populations.  The question is complicated by the wide 
array of potential analytical approaches, metrics, and methods that 
agencies employ.  There are three longstanding issues related to 
equity analysis practice:  community definition, the long-range focus 
of typical equity analyses, and the failure to articulate a normative 
equity standard or clear decision rule that would identify when a plan 
would be judged fair or just. 
First, the approach to community definition discussed above 
embodies a number of shortcomings.  Fundamentally, its focus is on 
identifying communities (e.g., low-income neighborhoods) rather 
than populations (e.g., low-income people).  This means that 
members of protected populations who reside outside identified 
communities would not be included in calculated performance 
metrics while non-protected populations living within identified 
geographies would be included.  Some protected populations tend to 
concentrate spatially, so community definitions might be of some use; 
however, performance metrics calculated for groups likely to be 
widely dispersed (e.g., seniors, single-parent households, bus riders, 
or low-income people) would not be accurate.288  Other approaches 
that combine multiple protected populations into a single community 
definition are even less likely to result in accurate measures.289 
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Second, the long-range focus of most MPO planning means that 
many MPOs model the effects of transportation investments to 
generate the data used for their Title VI and EJ Executive Order 
analyses.  This raises serious concerns because MPO models cannot 
currently predict, with reasonable certainty, the future locations of 
racial or ethnic groups at a neighborhood scale.  Further, observed 
differences in travel behavior between racial and ethnic groups are 
not used as inputs to travel demand models.290  This is particularly 
problematic in the U.S. where racial demographics have shifted 
dramatically in just ten years.291  This colorblind approach cannot 
comply with Title VI and the DOT EJ Order, which require a 
determination of whether the LRTP and its investments are fair to 
minority populations defined by “race, color or national origin.”292 
Finally, determining whether there is a discriminatory or 
disproportionately high and adverse effect on federally protected 
populations ultimately comes down to interpretation.  In 2014, 
Martens and Golub reviewed the equity analysis practice of the ten 
largest MPOs in the United States.293  They focused on whether and 
how the equity assessments accounted for accessibility changes, the 
time periods considered, and whether any normative standards were 
employed in the assessment of equity.294  The study found that MPOs 
rarely justified their analytical choices, described their methods in 
explicit detail, or provided straightforward interpretations of their 
results.  Some agencies produced voluminous reports with 
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sophisticated analyses covering a wide range of equity concerns while 
others presented only minimal analyses of accessibility impacts.295  
Even when more explicitly employed, decisions about equity were 
based on a “proportionality” criterion, wherein a population group 
was judged to receive a fair share of the benefits of the plan if they 
received a share equivalent to their share of the overall population.296  
But such a criterion ignores longstanding legacies of discrimination 
and foregone benefits.  A more appropriate “gap closing” mode of 
analysis would identify existing disparities and seek to close them.297 
V.  REFORMS NEEDED 
Strong, clear guidance from the DOT, akin to HUD’s AFFH rule, 
is needed to ensure that MPOs meet their affirmative obligation to 
identify and address inequities.  Given likely changes in federal 
practice and oversight under the Trump Administration, especially in 
the areas of enforcement, improvement will need to come from the 
local level.  Advocates with their state legislatures and state 
departments of transportation should lead the way by adopting their 
own statutes and regulatory guidance for MPOs.298  Further, 
individual MPOs have the power to act on their own.  This final Part 
proposes three kinds of analyses, keyed to each of the three drivers of 
regional equality identified in Part II:  improvements in governance, 
access to opportunities, and the distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of regional investments. 
A. Achieving Fair Governance 
MPOs should be required to analyze the equity of their governance 
by quantifying the relative voting power of minority residents.  As 
previously mentioned, MPO boards are generally constituted based 
on one-government, one-vote structures, or more complex schemes 
that incorporate disparities associated with unelected representation 
of cities, regardless of size.  This often results in boards that lack 
racial and ethnic diversity relative to the region’s population.299  
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Instead, MPO boards are typically dominated by small jurisdictions 
that are disproportionately more white and affluent than the region.  
This calls into question MPOs as legitimate democratic regional 
institutions.300 
Ultimately, MPO reform should move to the direct election of 
board members so they are accountable to regional constituencies.301  
In the meantime, the DOT should require MPO equity analyses to 
include a component that quantifies and addresses voting power 
disparities.  An administrative complaint brought to FTA in 2011 
illustrates a useful methodology for analyzing such disparities.  A 
Boston-based advocacy group, Alternatives for Community and 
Environment Inc. (“ACE”), filed the complaint, specifically 
challenging the representational structure of the Boston Region 
Metropolitan Planning Organization (“Boston MPO”) as 
discriminatory.302  Typical of MPOs throughout the United States,303 
the composition of the Boston MPO’s board strongly favored 
suburban interests and severely disadvantaged the region’s African 
American and minority communities. 
In support of its complaint, Boston ACE submitted an analysis of 
differences in voting power among jurisdictions represented in the 
MPO governing board, which had fourteen seats representing 
municipalities within its boundaries.304  By dividing the number of 
votes per municipality by its population, Boston ACE calculated a 
measure of relative voting power.  Suburban locations had much 
higher voting power than central areas like Boston and the “inner 
                                                                                                                 
PATTERNS OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING ORGANIZATION BOARDS 12-13 (2006), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20060124_mpos.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LJ8L-THHZ].  Sanchez studied fifty MPO’s from across the country 
and found that the racial and ethnic composition of MPO voting boards were very 
different from the metropolitan areas they represented. See id.  While the metro 
areas were about forty percent nonwhite, only about twelve percent of board 
members were nonwhite. See id. 
 300. See id.  Sanchez found that suburban jurisdictions were systematically 
overrepresented:  fifty-six percent of residents in the metro areas lived in urban 
jurisdictions but only had twenty-nine percent of board votes, while forty-four 
percent of residents lived in suburban areas with fifty-five percent of the votes. See id. 
at 9. 
 301. Portland, Oregon, has the only directly elected regional government—
Portland Metro. Nate Berg, The Only Elected Regional Government in the U.S., 
CITYLAB (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2012/03/only-elected-
regional-government-us/1371 [https://perma.cc/ZA4X-D3VT]. 
 302. See Complaint, from Boston Alts. for Cmty. & Env’t, to the Fed. Transit 
Admin. (Dec. 22, 2011) (on file with authors). 
 303. Sanchez & Wolf, supra note 61, at 265. 
 304. Id. at app. A. 
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core communities” sub-region of the metropolitan area.305  Those 
suburban locations also had a higher percentage of white residents.  
Such an analysis is easily performed using readily available census 
data and an understanding of the voting rules for the MPO.306 
DOT guidance should not only require these analyses of voting 
power discrepancy to be completed, but should specify a threshold 
beyond which imbalances will be considered discriminatory, and a 
range of actions that should be taken to correct those imbalances.  
Given that MPO board composition is, to some extent, constrained by 
federal statute,307 fully addressing this governance question will 
ultimately require congressional or administrative action.  Still, a 
bottom-up approach can more immediately address these issues, and 
not only bring greater transparency and inclusivity to regional 
decision-making, but also aid in ensuring that important perspectives 
are not excluded from this important forum for regional dialog and 
decision-making. 
B. Improving Access to Opportunity 
The most lasting and important benefits of transportation systems 
are derived from the accessibility they provide.308  Despite the 
importance of accessibility as an outcome of transportation 
investments, the DOT provides no guidance for its analysis.  This 
Section describes a robust analysis of access to opportunity for 
inclusion in MPO equity analyses. 
Accessibility is affected by both land use and transportation 
infrastructure.  If activity density increases in a location, accessibility 
will also increase, potentially without any transportation-related 
intervention.  Increasing density is known to affect travel demand, so 
                                                                                                                 
 305. Id. at 265. 
 306. Boston ACE argued this was a decision with discriminatory impacts that 
violated Title VI.  However, the FTA adopted a narrow interpretation of 
“discrimination” that did not include underrepresentation or discriminatory voting 
structures:  “[f]or a voting structure to violate Title VI, a complainant would need to 
present facts demonstrating that the voting structure is creating or has created 
intentional or unintentional discrimination,” by establishing “that the interests of 
smaller towns are aligned” or a “nexus between voting structure and project 
prioritization.” Response to FTA Complaint No. 2013-0039, from Dawn Sweet, 
Complaint Lead Off. of Civ. Rts., Fed. Transit Admin., to Eugene Benson, Dir. of 
Legal Counsel, Boston Alts. for Cmty. & Env’t (June 7, 2013) (on file with authors).  
The only federally mandated requirement for MPO governance was to comply with 
“applicable State or local law.” Id.  According to FTA, this requirement was fulfilled. 
See id. 
 307. See 23 C.F.R. § 450.310 (2017). 
 308. See generally Martens, supra note 108 (arguing that the core benefit of 
transportation is accessibility). 
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travel outcomes would also likely change.309  Travel mode (e.g., 
automobile or transit) also affects calculated accessibilities, as do the 
types of destinations considered.  Former Secretary of Transportation 
Anthony Foxx’s “Ladders of Opportunity” initiative is specifically 
motivated to seek funding to address connectivity gaps that affect 
accessibility, for example through grants to improve local bus services 
and address the mobility needs of those with transportation 
disadvantages, or through its “Local Foods, Local Places” program 
which provides technical support that helps local communities 
integrate local food systems into neighborhood planning.310  It is 
unlikely the Trump Administration will continue these initiatives. 
Many MPOs already include accessibility metrics in their equity 
analyses and often rely upon a cumulative opportunities measure that 
provides an average number of job opportunities accessible from each 
origin location in a region within a given amount of time by a 
particular mode.311  For example, an MPO might calculate the 
average number of jobs that can be reached within forty-five minutes 
on public transit from “low-income communities” and compare that 
result to the overall regional mean.312  If the total number of jobs 
accessible to low-income communities exceeds the regional mean, the 
MPO would conclude that the plan is equitable. 
These approaches can be strengthened through the adoption of 
four improvements.  First, community definitions and the types of 
destinations considered in the analysis should be defined based on 
meaningful public engagement.  It may be the case that communities 
are concerned less about job access and more about access to schools, 
healthy food, or dialysis centers.  It may also be the case that low-
income populations must be assessed alongside low-income 
communities to get an accurate representation of the transportation 
conditions they face.313 
Second, the relative performance of modes should be assessed.  
While low-income communities might enjoy more transit access than 
                                                                                                                 
 309. See, e.g., Reid Ewing & Robert Cervero, Travel and the Built Environment:  
A Meta-Analysis, 76 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 265, 276-77 (2010). 
 310. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., LADDERS OF OPPORTUNITY, 
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/FactSheet_USDOTLadders.p
df [https://perma.cc/ZP2U-G6K8]. 
 311. Rowangould et al., supra note 282, at 154-58. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Emerging travel demand modeling frameworks tend to simulate the behavior 
of travelers at the individual level.  Known as “activity-based models,” these 
analytical tools hold great promise for equity analysis that has generally not been 
realized. See, e.g., Karner & Niemeier, supra note 277, at 131. 
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other communities, the total level of transit access likely pales in 
comparison to that by automobile.314  If rates of automobile 
ownership are low in low-income communities, their opportunities 
are likely to be severely constrained by their reliance on transit.  
Thus, the difference between automobile and transit accessibility 
should be considered as well. 
Third, the analysis should be oriented towards mitigating identified 
gaps between automobile and transit and between low-income and 
non-low income populations, rather than taking existing disparities 
for granted.  A cumulative impact approach should be used to 
highlight existing disparities; a marginal improvement from an 
unequal starting point does not mean that equity has been achieved. 
A fourth and final way to strengthen MPO equity analyses is to 
meaningfully consider the fundamental conditions that restrict access 
to housing in high-opportunity suburban areas, especially for low-
wage workers.  The historical overview given in Part I documented 
how local control allowed high opportunity areas to restrict access to 
housing by race and income.  While such measures are no longer 
legal, there are exclusionary practices that communities continue to 
employ to effectively reduce affordable housing production.315  On 
the other hand, there is some work demonstrating that locations that 
provide housing opportunities well-suited to the wage levels of locally 
employed workers experience lower commute distances for those 
workers, even when controlling for other aspects of the built 
environment known to affect commute distance.316  This result 
suggests that measures of the fit between local jobs and housing 
affordability could be employed to understand where there are 
mismatches and how to mitigate them through the regional planning 
process.317 
                                                                                                                 
 314. See generally Aaron Golub & Karel Martens, Using Principles of Justice to 
Assess the Modal Equity of Regional Transportation Plans, 41 J. TRANSP. 
GEOGRAPHY 10 (2014) (directly comparing accessibility by transit versus accessibility 
by automobile and defining an “access poverty” threshold). 
 315. See generally Rachel G. Bratt & Abigail Vladeck, Addressing Restrictive 
Zoning for Affordable Housing:  Experiences in Four States, 24 HOUS. POL’Y 
DEBATE 594, 594-96 (2014); Rolf Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain 
of Exclusion, 66 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 125, 127-130 (2000). 
 316. Alex Karner, Asst. Prof., Univ. of Ga., & Chris Benner, Dorothy E. Everett 
Glob. Info. & Soc. Entrepreneurship Chair, Univ. of Cal., Santa Cruz, The 
Convergence of Social Equity and Environmental Sustainability:  Jobs-Housing Fit 
and Commute Distance, Address at 95th Annual Meeting of the Transp. Res. Board 
(2015). 
 317. See, e.g., Benner & Karner, supra note 106, at 885-89. 
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C. Analyzing and Addressing the Inequitable Distribution of 
Benefits and Burdens 
As described in Part I, the benefits that suburbanizing middle-
income whites received from regional transportation investments did 
not translate into corresponding benefits for low-income residents of 
color, whose needs were markedly different.  In fact, those residents 
were more likely to bear the brunt of the burdens of freeway (and 
some regional public transit) construction and urban renewal than to 
benefit from those plans and projects.318 
A meaningful assessment of whether the benefits and burdens of 
the LRTP and its investments are equitably distributed requires 
clarity about what counts as a benefit to an underserved community.  
It also requires clarity about the specific harms that—both historically 
and presently—befall underserved communities and their residents.  
Finally, it requires clarity about how to identify the projects or 
alternatives that are likely to bestow those benefits, or avert those 
harms. 
The California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) has pioneered an 
approach to answering these questions.  CARB requires that a fair 
share of revenues from the state’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund 
(“GGRF”) be spent to benefit disadvantaged communities, as 
required by California Senate Bill 535 (“SB 535”).319  While SB 535 
only applies to projects funded by the GGRF,320 it stands as a 
national best practice for an equity assessment of a LRTP. 
Under CARB’s Funding Guidelines, benefits “meaningfully 
address an important community need” in a disadvantaged 
community.321  This definition of a “benefit” should be used by MPOs 
                                                                                                                 
 318. See supra Part II. 
 319. See AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FUNDING GUIDELINES 
SUPPLEMENT FOR FY 2016-17 FUNDS 5 (2016) [hereinafter CARB FUNDING 
GUIDELINES SUPPLEMENT], https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auctionproceeds
/final_supplemental_ggrf_funding_guidelines_12_30.pdf [https://perma.cc/3HFD-
4963] (defining “disadvantaged communities” using CalEnviroScreen, a state-
developed tool that identifies areas facing disproportionately high burdens and 
cumulative exposures); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39713 (West 2017). 
 320. CARB FUNDING GUIDELINES SUPPLEMENT, supra note 319, at 1.  One 
difference between SB 535 and the requirement that MPO plans provide for an 
equitable distribution of benefits and burdens is that SB 535 requires a set-aside of 
funds to benefit disadvantaged communities, rather than simply an equitable 
distribution of benefits.  The ARB guidance discussed in this Section, however, is 
geared specifically at the question of what counts as a benefit, a critical question that 
must be answered in both contexts. 
 321. AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CAP-AND-TRADE AUCTION 
PROCEEDS:  FUNDING GUIDELINES FOR AGENCIES THAT ADMINISTER CALIFORNIA 
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to achieve equitable outcomes,322 and to prevent the delay of benefits 
to minority and low-income populations.323 
The GGRF program requires that twenty-five percent of each 
year’s funding benefits disadvantaged communities.324  The DOT 
should so too explicitly require MPOs to ensure an appropriate share, 
if not annually, at least over the four-year lifetime of the TIP, benefits 
disadvantaged communities.  It should also require MPOs to 
transparently phase the plan’s project and investment 
implementation, and to specifically identify which investments, in 
which years, are expected to meet the priority needs of minority and 
low-income populations.  The San Diego Association of Governments 
(“SANDAG”) case exemplifies the importance of “significant delay” 
issues in the MPO context.325  In that case, the benefits of 
SANDAG’s LRTP for underserved communities were buried in the 
last decade of the plan, a fact the trial and appellate courts found to 
be unjust.326 
Other provisions of the CARB guidelines could be recommended 
for DOT consideration, including that state funding agencies give 
priority to those investments that provide the most benefits to 
disadvantaged communities,327 defined as projects which provide 
“direct, meaningful, and assured benefits to one or more 
disadvantaged communities.”328 
In terms of the burdens of investment, CARB’s GGRF Funding 
Guidelines require that projects “be designed to avoid substantial 
burdens, such as physical or economic displacement of low income 
disadvantaged community residents and businesses or increased 
                                                                                                                 
CLIMATE INVESTMENTS 2-6 (2015) [hereinafter CARB FUNDING GUIDELINES], 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auctionproceeds/arb-funding-guidelines-for-
ca-climate-investments.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT8L-LMZH]; see id. at 1.A-12 
(requiring reporting on “disadvantaged community benefits and . . . strategies the 
agency will use to maximize benefits” to them). 
 322. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 234, at 1, 3. 
 323. FTA CIRCULAR 4703.1, supra note 179, at 2; see also UPDATED DOT 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ORDER 5610.2(A), supra note 94, at app. § 1(f) (defining 
“adverse effects”). 
 324. See CARB FUNDING GUIDELINES SUPPLEMENT, supra note 319, at 5. 
 325. See generally Petition for Writ of Mandate in Intervention, Cleveland Nat’l 
Forest Found. v. San Diego Ass’n of Gov’ts Bd. of Dirs., No. 37-2011-00101593-CU-
TT-CTL (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2012) 
 326. See id. at app. 1. 
 327. See CARB FUNDING GUIDELINES, supra note 321, at 2.A-6. 
 328. Id. at 2-2. 
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exposure to toxics or other health risks.”329  Further, CARB’s 
guidelines recommend avoiding, rather than mitigating, substantial 
burdens on protected populations.330  DOT guidance along these lines 
would help meet many of the key functions described earlier with 
respect to this driver of inequality.  Currently, where federal plan 
approval is required the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(“NEPA”), may require some environmental justice impacts to be 
analyzed as part of an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”).331  
While NEPA has been a useful tool for promoting environmental 
justice,332 MPO plans are not subject to a NEPA-type review.333 
This Article also advocates for an approach that defines the 
parameters and goals of the equity analysis before review of a given 
plan.  An a priori approach develops equity measures and standards 
before the LRTP is assembled instead of merely analyzing the plan 
after the fact.  Such an approach was taken by Portland Metro, the 
MPO for the Portland, Oregon, region, when it convened a working 
group of community-based organizations, representatives of local 
government, and anyone else interested, over a two-year period to 
develop an equity analysis to screen projects for inclusion in the 
LRTP.334  This kind of approach would invite greater community 
                                                                                                                 
 329. CARB FUNDING GUIDELINES SUPPLEMENT, supra note 319, at Appendix-6 
(emphasis added). 
 330. See generally id. 
 331. See Memorandum on Guidance on Environmental Justice and NEPA from 
Gloria M. Shepherd, Assoc. Adm’r for Plan., Env’t, and Realty, Fed. Highway 
Admin., to Dirs. of Field Servs., Fed. Lands Highway Div. Eng’rs, U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp. (Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/guidance_
ej_nepa.asp [https://perma.cc/6X32-ACGF]; see also FTA, CIRCULAR 4703.1, supra 
note 179, at ch. V. But see FTA CIRCULAR 4702.1B, supra note 84, at ch. I 
(“Recipients are cautioned that while there may be overlap, engaging in an EJ 
analysis under Federal transportation planning and NEPA provisions will not satisfy 
Title VI requirements . . . .”). 
 332. An example is the “Zoo Interchange” complaint. See Milwaukee Inner-City 
Congregations Allied for Hope v. Gottlieb, 944 F. Supp. 2d 656, 660-74 (W.D. Wis. 
2013). 
 333. There is no formal link between plan making and NEPA evaluations. 23 
C.F.R. § 450.338. There is interest, however, to link them by strengthening the 
planning process so that certain planning goals can be used directly as inputs to 
NEPA—especially “purpose and need” statements for NEPA.  For more discussion 
about these links, see AM. ASS’N OF ST. HIGHWAY & TRANSP. OFFICIALS, 
PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK:  USING THE TRANSPORTATION PLANNING PROCESS TO 
SUPPORT THE NEPA PROCESS (2008), http://environment.transportation.org/pdf/
programs/practitioners_handbook10.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CKV-WC9U]. 
 334. 2018 Regional Transportation Plan:  Equity, OR. METRO, http://www.oregon
metro.gov/public-projects/2018-regional-transportation-plan/equity 
[https://perma.cc/PVL3-9WVH]. 
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engagement in the planning processes, in addition to yielding more 
equitable outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
Requiring that MPO equity analyses identify and address 
governance disparities, as well as the fair distribution of benefits and 
burdens and impediments to full and equal access to opportunity, 
would provide a significant tool for tackling patterns of inequality at 
the metropolitan regional scale.  This must involve explicit 
identification of the drivers of inequality to produce adequate 
remedies tailored to address those drivers. 
Though states and MPOs themselves can lead the way in 
developing community-centered approaches to action-oriented, 
multi-dimensional equity analyses, and draw guidance from the HUD 
AFFH rule, new rules at the federal level would ensure uniform 
processes and judicial recourse.  This Article emphasizes the need for 
the DOT to adopt its own AFFH rule, or a rule that requires MPOs 
to conduct their Title VI and EJ Executive Order analyses in a 
manner that generally tracks the HUD rule.  Doing so is crucial, not 
only to realize HUD’s vision for regional coordination in addressing 
segregation and discrimination in housing, but also to ensure that 
MPO transportation plans are identifying and addressing today’s 
inequality with near-term actions and investments that are responsive 
to the critical needs of underserved communities and populations. 
